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A general aviation industry segment member known as a Certified Non-scheduled Air Taxi 
Operator (CNATO) conducts passenger flights on-demand for hire.  While airline accidents have 
reached historic lows, CNATO accident rates remain above one per 100,000 hours (NTSB, 
2015b).  Unlike airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration has not made safety management 
system implementation mandatory within CNATOs.  As a result, there has been no decrease in 
CNATO organizational accidents over a 6-year period since 2009.  Study goals strove to find a 
predictable method of variable identification influencing at-risk CNATOs.    
The study utilized a sequential transformative design comprising quantitative surveys and 
aviation accident databases to answer four research questions.  Research questions used 
explanatory correlational methodology of independent and intervening variables examining 
descriptive, relational, and comparative results.  Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement 
System (SCISMS) and Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) Form 5x served as survey 
instruments that gathered leadership and safety culture information.  Accident data was obtained 
from government sources through the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
(ASAIS) database. 
An inclusion criterion, stratified random cluster, and systematic random sampling 
narrowed the entire 2,046 CNATO population to a sample size of 25 participants from three 
FAA flight standards regional offices.  Each participant had 3 weeks to complete an online 
survey containing 106 questions.  Twenty participants completed the survey.  Data analysis 
followed a discriminant function analysis to develop quantitative correlations between multiple 
variables.  Characteristics of each participant yielded no conclusive data to suggest CNATOs 
xvi 
 
share common safety culture dimension dominance.  Study results concluded there was no 
relationship between leadership style, safety culture dominance, and accident rates.  A 
comparison of CNATOs using safety management systems and accident rates also showed no 
relationship exists.  The final research question sought to find a relationship between leadership 
style, safety dimension, and accident rate.  None was found, however, a statistical trend emerged 
outside the research questions as a result of sequential research design.  Data indicated a 
relationship among transformational leadership characteristic scale and SCISMS mean score.  
While the study yielded seminal individual results, research questions proved safety culture 
remains difficult to define and found relationships to identify at-risk organizations remains 
elusive.                 
 
Keywords:  safety culture, high reliability organization, organizational accidents, aviation, 






Chapter I: Introduction 
According to the latest statistics, general aviation aircraft for hire classified as Certified 
Non-scheduled Air Taxi Operators (CNATO), flew over 1.8 million hours (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 2015).  These commercial operators provide critical aviation charter 
services, from medical transport to traffic reports.  Although these professional aircraft operators 
are certificated to serve the public, it was not until 2006 regulations that they became subject to 
mandated safety management systems.  Safety programs implemented by United States airlines 
have demonstrated their effectiveness by eliminating any airline accidents: there have been no 
fatalities since 2009.  However, aircraft operators within the non-scheduled FAA Part 135 
regulations, referred to in this study as CNATOs, have seen accident rates increase 36% in 2011 
over that of 2010 (Air Safety Institute, 2011).  The data for 2012 through 2014 revealed almost 
no change in overall accident rates, however, the lethality of accidents increased from 14.8% to 
15.9% (Air Safety Institute, 2012).  Understanding how CNATOs and their leaders create a 
culture of safety could aid the public good in stemming the increasing trend of accidents in the 
industry segment. 
Safety management systems (SMS) have evolved since their first development in military 
and airline uses.  The purpose of an SMS is to reduce the risk for catastrophic failure by 
developing a set of tools for early detection of accidents and other potentially harmful processes 
at the organizational level (Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006).   Used exclusively in high 
reliability organizations such as aircraft carrier operations and nuclear generation facilities, an 
SMS develops reliable processes to mitigate risk.  Now prevalent in aviation, it was not until the 
late 1980s, after a series of maintenance and pilot errors that the scheduled airline industry 




general aviation segment of the industry began to look at using a less rigorous version of the 
same methodology.   
Dating back to 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had been 
working to establish the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for adoption by the 
worldwide aviation agency.  The impetus for SARPs was in direct response to the desire by 
member countries to uniformly enact a comprehensive safety management system across all 
aircraft operations.  In 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration released Advisory Circular 
120-92A.  This circular established a basic safety recommendation framework for aircraft 
operators, and suggested new operating standards of SMS.  It is important to note that an 
Advisory Circular is an optional document that carries with it no penalties for non-compliance.  
The advisory circular served as a recommendation to CNATOs previously untouched by direct 
procedural regulation.  Wide scale adoption by CNATOs has yet to occur; this creates an 
opportunity to research how the industry segment manages potential implementation of a 
voluntary SMS and the leader influence on cultural adoption.  
Statement of the Problem 
Aviation organizations rely heavily on a high level of operational safety in order to 
function properly (Kelly & Patankar, 2004; Roberts & Libuser, 1993; Schein, 1983).  A lapse in 
safety can cause loss of life and organizational failures from which recovery is difficult.  For this 
reason, it is imperative that CNATOs adopt a culture which promotes safety and entrenches 
safety practices with which all staff members comply.  The classification of aviation as a high 
reliability organization has unique implications as to leadership approach and organizational 
culture development.  The general aviation industry has a gap in knowledge in developing a 




carrying entities.   With the advancement of high reliability organization methodologies and 
theory to prevent organizational accidents, the aviation industry has migrated toward the 
development of a SMS to improve safety.  Adoption of a SMS framework has taken many forms, 
but no single methodology has emerged.  Instead, CNATOs have chosen to implement a variety 
of different programs to serve their purposes.  Several differing methods of culture development 
and SMS adoption has elevated leadership influence as a clearly defined variable.  
When the rare organizational accident occurs, the people responsible for those actions 
often have no comprehension as to the cause (Reason, 1998).  After all, organizational accidents 
are hard to predict and often occur in areas where production or protection fails to cover such 
events.  Production is an overarching concept related to the production of services; in the case of 
aviation, the transportation of people (Reason, 1998).  This activity is thick in processes and 
procedures that comprise the various steps performed in order to produce the service.  Protection 
relates to the institutional methods taken to protect the service from human error (Reason, 1998).  
These can include simple checklists evaluating whether a trip should even be initiated to a 
complex task such as computer modeling to calculate the risk of the activity based on input 
parameters.   
There was substantial scholarly debate as to whether aviation safety can be categorized as 
either prolonged state of existence known as culture, or climate, a temporary state subject to 
change (O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011).  Surprisingly, the literature was unclear 
as to whether the existence of strong organizational safety culture impacts accident rates.  There 
were compelling examples of safety culture measurement within the military, but this has yet to 
be applied to general aviation (La Porte, Roberts, & Rochlin, 1988; Rochlin, La Porte, & 




an attempt to measure safety culture effectiveness (Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006).  
Aviation has enjoyed a historic decline in the number of fatal accidents in scheduled airline 
operations in the past 20 years.  This suggests that the decrease in fatal accidents is related to the 
inculcation of safety culture into the organizations responsible for carrying the paying 
passengers.  Unfortunately, there was no analysis as to whether results would apply in other 
aviation industry segments or what, if any, impact it had on organizational accidents.  Leadership 
influence and development of a strong safety culture largely influences whether CNATOs have 
integrated production and protection to prevent accidents from happening.  Therefore, research 
was necessary to determine variables in CNATOs which may reduce organizational accident 
rates. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The present study addressed the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety 
culture in CNATOs has an effect on organizational accidents.  The study (a) examined the way 
leadership introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety 
culture is implemented by followers, (c) investigated the types of artifacts used by the aircraft 
operator to provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determined the extent 
to which safety culture has an effect on overall safety results. 
Organizational safety in CNATOs has many intervening variables.  Leaders influence the 
creation and establishment of companywide methodologies and mechanisms for cultural 
development (Bass & Avolio, 1993).  These critical individuals serve as foundation blocks to 
create a safety culture.  Oversight agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration and 
accrediting bodies only focus on basic compliance.  Some organizations tie compliance to 




culture.  The study investigated the causal link between leadership sponsored safety initiatives, 
the development of a safety culture, and their effect on accident rates within a sampling of 
CNATOs.  
While NTSB statistics demonstrate aviation as low risk in relation to other transportation 
methods, the high frequency of aviation operations allow more potential organizational accidents 
to occur.  CNATO safety culture development lacks consistency and provides an opportunity to 
examine various factors that may influence a reduction in accident rates.  Without a frequently 
modified, time-tested, common set of best practices based on current data, industry safety rates 
will likely remain unchanged.  Third-party provided safety programs satisfy regulator demands, 
but no study determined whether these programs influence the organizational culture as opposed 
to internally developed safety programs.  These are areas that were worthy of investigation and 
could result in public good by increasing operational, organizational, and cultural safety.  
Compliance with safety requirements has an impact on all areas of aviation in the public 
perception of aviation as a safe mode of transportation.  Due to intense media scrutiny for 
aviation accidents and incidents, it is of critical importance for professionals in the industry to 
promote safety culture and seek to achieve scheduled airline reliability.  The study of newly 
enacted SMS requirements is of major importance to CNATOs and to overall aviation.  
Assumptions have been made that aviation, an industry already rich in processes, benefits further 
from SMS programs.  The addition of regulations to create a safety culture could artificially 
influence the actual process of establishing a safety culture.  Research had not been carried out to 
assess the variables influencing safety culture.  Further study of the causal relationship between 




Due to the absence of research on whether safety culture has an effect on overall safety 
results, the study aimed to measure safety culture practices among selected CNATOs and draw 
inferences from the findings.  There is a lack of literature providing analysis of the relationship 
between SMS, safety culture and overall accident rates. The creation of safety culture in military 
aviation operations has been previously examined, but the mission and style of military 
operations are only minimally comparable to the typical CNATO (La Porte et al., 1988; Roberts, 
Rousseau, & La Porte, 1994; Roberts, Stout, Halpern, Haas, & Hall, 1994; Rochlin et al., 1998).  
A closer analysis of aviation safety culture and SMS effectiveness was conducted in Part 121 
airline operations (Gibbons et al., 2006).  The same rigor with which previous studies have 
evaluated safety variables has not been applied to research in CNATOs.  This study seeks to 
bring clarity for a large segment of the industry who collectively fly 19 million flight hours a 
year.  
A sequential transformative mixed method approach used established theoretical 
frameworks to measure the relationship between an existence of strong safety culture, the effect 
of leadership influence, and organizational accidents.  Research questions were explored using 
quantitative methods.  Accident databases provided data from NTSB, NASA, and FAA public 
records available on the internet.  At the same time, the effect of leadership and SMS influence 
was explored using a survey with a representative group of CNATOs within a random stratified 
sample demographic and geography.  The rationale for using quantitative data was to encourage 
impartiality in addressing the research problem by converging both broad numeric trends in 
accident data and detailed statistical views of operations within each CNATO. 
The purpose of this study was to (a) determine the safety culture characteristics possessed 




organizational culture and performance outcomes, including accident rates, (c) identify what 
difference, if any, exists in accident rates of CNATOs that use safety management system 
programs and those that do not, and (d) identify what relationships, if any, exist between 
CNATO leadership style, the development of a safety culture and accident rates. 
Recent Statistics 
The following tables classified total hours flown by CNATOs in comparison to the other 
aircraft types in 2014 and accident rates for each phase of flight in 2012.  While the total hours 
flown demonstrate only a fraction of the total across the entire industry, the professional nature 
of the flight implies a higher standard is required.  
Table 1  
Total Air Taxi Hours Flown by Aircraft Type in 2014 
Aircraft Type 
 




Air Taxi Air Tours Air Med 
Fixed Wing: Total       




2,185,564 89,480 197,087 




4.6 19.5 12.6        
Piston: Total 
      




553,555 63,697 24,260 




10.0 30.0 32.5        
Turboprop: Total 
      




586,263 22,442 95,184 




3.6 13.5 6.9        
Turbojet: Total 
      




1,045,745 3,342 77,643 




2.5 34.8 8.3 
Note. Data in this table are from General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys - CY 2014, 






Non-Scheduled Air Taxi Accident Rates 2012 
Types of Accidents Accidents Fatal Accidents Lethality 
Collision 3 7.3% 2 16.7% 66.7% 
Descent/Approach 2 4.9% 2 16.7% 100.0% 
Fuel Management 3 7.3% 1 8.3% 33.3% 
Go-Around 2 4.9% 0 
  
Landing 6 14.6% 1 8.3% 16.7% 
Maneuvering 1 2.4% 1 8.3% 100.0% 
Mechanical 5 12.2% 1 8.3% 20.0% 
Other 2 4.9% 1 8.3% 50.0% 
Other (Power Loss) 1 2.4% 0 
  
Takeoff 7 17.1% 1 8.3% 14.3% 
Taxi 4 9.8% 0 
  
Weather 5 12.2% 2 16.7% 40.0% 
Note:  Adapted from the 24th Joseph Nall Report: General Aviation Accidents in 2012, by Air 
Safety Institute, 2012.  Copyright 2012 by Air Safety Institute. Adapted with permission. 
 
Research Questions 
This proposal created quantitative data points in order to address four key research 
questions.  The study answered the following questions: 
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?  
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with 
performance outcomes, including accident rates? 
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use 
commercially available safety management system programs and those that do not?  
4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the 




Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis 
  Established conceptual frameworks assisted in describing core constructs between 
CNATO intervening variables and accident rates.  Due to the highly complex nature of the topic, 
these frameworks helped clarify the basic concepts to answer research question.  Organizational 
accident, high reliability organization, and safety culture theory all play critical roles in the 
study.  
The theoretical framework of organizational accident theory assisted in the ability to 
define what is outside of normal operations.  Reaching prominence in the wake of organizational 
failures, the field is highly mature and provided characteristics of lapses in culture that create 
accidents.  An organizational accident is the result of technological processes that have radically 
altered the relationship between machines and their human elements (Reason, 1997).  The 
relationship between man and aircraft describes such a situation.  Organizational accident theory 
examines the casual sequence, organizational factors, workplace conditions, and unsafe acts as 
root causes of individual accidents.  Scientific inquiry was then employed to examine upstream 
organizational factors contributing to the accident to investigate variable interactions addressed 
in the research questions.  
Second, the concept of high reliability organization (HRO) theory was used to create a 
link between industries demanding greater operational standards.  Measurements in the HRO 
fields have established the ability to qualitatively and quantitatively capture the degree to which 
an organization has achieved culture change.  In framing the research in this method, a 
comparison was drawn across industries. 
A theoretical framework used by the study was the influence of leadership on the creation 




uncertain and changing organizations to assess leaders’ resiliency.  The literature created a 
structural and static construct of meanings which a group collectively addressed hazards in a 
systematic way (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Empowering participants in high-risk 
activities create positive cognitive mindsets, thus preventing hazards (Pidgeon, 1991).  When 
assessing the true ability of a participant organization to reach safety culture, a construct rich in 
meaning to the aviation industry is used.  Patankar and Sabin (2010) developed a theoretical 
framework to help understand the elements of safety culture and their interactions with 
organizations.   
 
Figure 1.  Safety culture pyramid.  Describes progression of safety culture methods, results of 
assessment, and transformation.  From Human Factors in Aviation (2nd ed., pp. 95-122), by M. S. 
Patankar and E. J. Sabin, 2010, Burlingame, MA: Ashgate. Copyright 2010 by Ashgate 





Figure 1 shows various levels of organizational safety culture development from cursory 
behaviors to underlying values and unquestioned assumptions.  Leadership in combination with 
the use of this widely accepted process methodology around aviation safety culture and related 
fields ranging from healthcare to military applications will allow for the study to establish a 
strong theoretical foundation (Beebe, 2013; Kelly, Meyer, & Patankar, 2012).   
Organizational culture is a nebulous term with various meanings.  This seemingly simple 
concept has sparked great debate whether an activity or behavior is sustainable enough to 
become a culture, or whether it remains a climate.  The general definition of culture is a system 
of shared meaning held by members that distinguish one organization from another organization 
(Schein, 1983).  In contrast, Zohar (1980) defines climate as a summary of perceptions that 
employees share about their work environment.  The general consensus is climate comprises an 
element within organizational culture that focuses on the more short term impact of storytelling 
(Schein, 1996).  More specifically, climate can be characterized as a “mood state” at a particular 
moment in time (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 192).  Culture is more inherently a sustained state of being 
that resists frequent changes and distractions within the organization. 
It is important to note that the inculcation of a successful safety culture in a CNATO is 
dependent upon the existence of strong leadership and foundation of rich processes.  The 
resulting safety culture creates an environment free from organizational accidents.  
Interdependency of these theoretical frameworks necessitate a reference to each idea 
independently. 
Figure 2 graphically represents the foundational building blocks of frameworks used in 





safety culture.  From data collected, the study will answer whether organizational accidents 







Figure 2.  Dissertation conceptual framework. Represents building block knowledge constructs. 
Leadership influence and processes forms foundation of understanding HRO safety culture, 
which then creates reader context for organizational accidents. 
 
Directional hypothesis.  The quantitative data presented in military safety literature and 
the experience of the researcher lead to a hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
variables.  In a directional hypothesis “the investigator makes a prediction about the expected 
outcome, basing this prediction on prior literature and studies on the topic that suggest a potential 
outcome” (Creswell, 2009, p. 145).  A common business process analysis tool used in the private 
sector is the Gartner Group Magic Quadrant.   
Figure 3 represents a graphical visualization of theoretical frameworks and their 
relationship to the study hypothesis.  The chart represents relationships in a 2x2 chart with the 
least advantageous process or product being in the bottom right quadrant.  In listing the two 
prevailing variables on the axis, a curvilinear representation develops based on hypothesized data 
results.  The curvilinear relationship with various safety phenomenon and behavioral outcomes 
has been statistically proven by Zohar and Luria (2005) and Perrow (1984).  Therefore, it is 







to an absence of contradictory anecdotal data.  For the directional hypothesis posed here, the 
greater the influence of safety culture and leadership influence, the less organizations are prone 
to accidents.  This hypothesis remains true as culture reaches equilibrium with leadership 
influence at which point micromanagement negatively affects organizational accident reduction 
rates.  A set of quasi-experimental procedures embedded within the selected instrumentation 
yielded specific statements for hypothesis testing to either validate or invalidate this hypothesis. 






Safety Culture  
Figure 3.  Aviation safety magic quadrant. 
  The following quantitative statement describes the relational phenomenon hypothesis 
between study variables:  
H1: Organizational accidents moderate the curvilinear relationship between safety culture 
and leadership influence in such a way that an intermediate level of detail of leadership influence 




Limitations of the Study  
As with any academic research study, there were limitations as to the reach and abilities 
of the researcher to conduct a comprehensive examination of the topic.  The study sought to 
generalize findings to those CNATOs in the most concentrated FAA regions to represent the 
entire population.  Further, there are a large number of variables across the entire population that 
may have a factor on the effectiveness of safety culture and leadership impacts on accident rates.  
The limited number of variables selected for consideration in the research design are stated 
within Chapter III.  
The method in which federal government statisticians stratify accident data is difficult to 
isolate CNATO generalities within the random sample size.  This will require the researcher to 
make assumptions as to the type of aircraft operated by the CNATO and correspond accident 
data to those types of operations.  
The participants’ willingness to answer survey instrumentation honestly and openly is 
outside the control of researchers.  Every effort was made to ensure validation of outlier data is 
verified while maintaining the study integrity.  Should participants not divulge information, 
study results will be limited. 
Leadership styles, organizational safety culture are highly subjective.  Even with a 
reliable and valid instrument, there were influences and variables not considered which may be 
materially relevant to each study participant.   
Definition of Terms 
The purpose of this section is to assist in establishing a common understanding of how 




scientifically grounded research (Creswell, 2009).  Terms used throughout the study were 
presented in alphabetical order below: 
Abductive reasoning:  The collection and analysis of research data using multiple stages 
to gain clarity and meaning to an observation.  This is achieved by combining the reliability of 
empirical data with validity of lived experience.  Abductive reasoning is “understood as a 
process that values both deductive and inductive approaches but relies principally on the 
expertise, experience, and intuition of researchers” (Wheeldon & Åhlberg, 2012, p. 7). 
Aircraft accident:  
an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the 
aircraft receives substantial damage.  (14 CFR Title 49 §830.2) 
 
AOPA:  Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
Annex 1 through 19:  Amendments and additions to the Chicago Convention 
ASF:  Air Safety Foundation  
ATP:  Airline Transport Pilot 
CASA:  Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
Chicago Convention:  ICAO Chicago Convention of December 07, 1944 
CNATO:  Certificated Non-scheduled Air Taxi Operator classified under Part 135 of the 
Federal Aviation Administration regulations.  
FAA:  Federal Aviation Administration 
High Reliability Organization (HRO):  a subset of high-risk organizations designed and 
managed to avoid such accidents characterized by the response of the organization’s 
constituencies when it fails, the tendency to operate at or near the edge of human capacity, and 




IBAC:  International Business Aircraft Council 
ICAO:  International Civil Aeronautics Organisation 
Incident:  “an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations” 49 CFR §830.2  
ISBAO:  International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations 
NASA:  National Aeronautical and Space Administration 
NBAA:  National Business Aircraft Association 
Normal accidents:  unpreventable and unpredictable accidents involving complex 
systematic or equipment failures, signals only visible in retrospect, and/or operator error which is 
not fully correctable until after the accident has occurred (Perrow, 1984).  
Operating certificate:  a regulatory designation issued by a local FAA Flight Standards 
District Office to each CNATO authorizing and defining operating parameters of aircraft. 
Organizational Accident:  a comparatively rare but often catastrophic event that occurs 
within complex modern technology, such as nuclear power plants, commercial aviation, the 
petrochemical industry, chemical process plants, marine and rail transport, and the off-shore oil 
industry (Reason, 1997). 
Post hoc ergo propter hoc:  Philosophical fallacy theory from latin phrase meaning “after 
this, because of this”.  From the 1662 textbook of logic, La logique, ou l'art de penser was 
written anonymously by published by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole outlining the post hoc 
theory. 
Safety climate:  perceptions held by participants regarding molar perceptions they share 
of their organizational environment at a particular moment in time (Zohar, 1980).  A cultural 




Safety culture:  a prolonged state of organizational understanding, shared by the 
participants, of safety and its antecedents. “The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social 
and technical practices that are concerned with minimising the exposure of employees, 
managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious”  (Guldenmund, 2000, p. 228) 
Safety Management Systems (SMS):  “the formal, top-down business-like approach to 
managing safety risk. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the 
management of safety (including safety risk management, safety policy, safety assurance, and 
safety promotion)” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007, p. 1).  
Sociotechnical systems:  the tight integration and interdependency of systems with human 
interaction. 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs):  a proactive safety strategy based on 
the implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP) that systematically addresses safety risks, 
in agreement with the implementation of safety management systems (Parker, Lawrie, & 
Hudson, 2006). 
Summary 
NTSB statistical data has shown the rate of organizational accidents in CNATOs exceeds 
scheduled airline occurrences and has repeatedly placed it on their 2015 “Most Wanted List” 
(NTSB, n.d., 2015b).  A lack of academic research specific to CNATOs regarding identification 
of variables leading to organizational accidents has exposed the flying public to risk.  By 
applying established theoretical frameworks in organizational accidents, HRO, and safety 
culture, to a set of variables such as leadership influence and operational process compliance, a 




discoveries could help shape CNATO public policy and aid the public good in creating a safer 
flying experience.  
Using established theoretical frameworks in the field of organizational safety culture, 
HRO, and aviation, a context was created to better understand study objectives.  Little academic 
argument exists as to whether leadership influences safety culture because inclusion of SMS and 
organizational culture development is dependent upon leader initiation.  Examples of these 
variables reducing accident rates has been found in military applications, but has never been 
applied to CNATOs.  
The study seeks to answer four research questions:  
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?  
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with 
performance outcomes, including accident rates? 
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use 
commercially available safety management system programs and those that do not?  
4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the 
development of a safety culture and accident rates? 
To address the research questions, a sequential transformative mixed method approach 
determined whether a multivariate relationship exists among safety culture inculcation, 
leadership influence, and organizational accidents.  Finding an association and/or a relationship 






Chapter II: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this multi-disciplinary literature review was to properly provide a frame 
of reference for this study in the context of existing research addressing the topic of leadership 
and organizational culture development as it relates to aviation safety and to confirm the study’s 
unique contribution to the field.  The literature search utilized two university institutional 
libraries, Pepperdine University and Oklahoma State University, for cross-reference and access 
to additional resources.  Research was conducted via electronic database search of WorldCat and 
Summons search engines to identify peer-reviewed academic journal resources primarily 
consisting of EBSCOhost academic search complete, ABI/Inform Global, Emerald management 
extra, Wiley online library, Sage journals online, JSTOR, and Scopus.  In addition, ProQuest 
Dissertation and Thesis searches identified emerging research in the field of aviation safety and 
organizational dynamics.   
A search included word combinations of key terms to identify relevant empirical studies.  
Combinations included aviation leadership, high-trust, organizational culture, safety culture, 
safety climate, high reliability organizations, organizational accidents, and aviation accident data.  
Research regarding leadership and organizational culture yield largely qualitative studies.  Each 
study selected had to be an empirical investigation and meet one of three inclusion criterion.  
First was relevancy in the following areas of core leadership principles, organizational culture, 
and operational aviation characteristics at the individual level of analysis.  Second, studies had to 
base their findings on sound academic qualitative or quantitative investigative theory, and third, 




The body of literature strongly indicated a lack of research has occurred pertaining to 
identification of leadership traits and organizational culture development within aviation.  For 
this reason, Chapter II presents multi-discipline theory, constructs, and research that underlie the 
factors of creating an inculcation of a safety climate within certificated non-scheduled air taxi 
operators from the perspective of four domains: (a) the study of organizations’ (and thereby 
organizational leaders’) approach to leadership and its response to the development of a safety 
culture, (b) performance within an operating environment of high reliability organizations and 
their interrelationship with organizational culture, (c) the selection of core elements which 
contributed to the creation of an approved safety management system, and (d) the influence of 
safety culture on aircraft operator accident rates.  
Leadership Characteristics in Aviation 
“The organization's culture develops in large part from its leadership while the culture of 
an organization can also affect the development of its leadership” (Bass & Avolio, 1993, p. 112).  
The study of leadership is a broad and vast topic to explore.  A simple search in WorldCat using 
the word leadership yields over 839,000 entries.  Literature abounds in relation to the types, 
methods, and characteristics of leadership.  Despite the vastness of research, only a small, 
disconnected amount of literature supports the application of any prevalent traits or 
characteristics to aviation leaders.  While the literature has conducted individual research of 
leaders in airlines, aerospace, and other related occupations within aviation, there has been no 
consensus as to one superior leadership model (Kutz, 1998).  There is also an extensive presence 
of literature to support the connection to leadership influence on the development of a strong 
organizational culture (Beebe, 2013; Berkowitz & Wren, 2013; Chang & Lee, 2007; Meier, 




traits specifically in aviation, three distinct leadership models will be discussed for potential 
inclusion as a direct application to the operation of a certificated non-scheduled air taxi operator.     
Situational approach.  The aviation industry has a high degree of variability and 
regulatory restrictions.  Leaders must constantly adapt to a changing environment in which they 
operate.  As a result, a situational approach to leadership emerges as one industry prevalent 
construct.  Situational leadership was established by Hersey and Blanchard (1969) as a response 
to Reddin’s (1967) 3-D management style theory and the Managerial Grid of Blake and Mouton 
(1964).  Both these new models were based on the groundbreaking work of Stodgill (1948) and 
his attempts to define and focus research on the identification of leadership traits (Northouse, 
2012).  The rigidity and absoluteness of prior leadership grids did not appeal to Hersey and 
Blanchard.  Researchers set out to address the gap in research and believed there was an 
opportunity to create a more relevant and workable model to account for variable situations 
(Hambleton & Gumpert, 1982).  After several iterations of the situational leadership model, they 
introduced the concept of tri-dimensional leadership. 
A Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effectiveness model posits a leader response does not 
exhibit a single characteristic or style, but rather is completely situational and varies based on the 
leader, follower, and situation (Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 1996; Northouse, 2012).  While 
not directly including aviation organizations in the list of applicable industries, they state: 
Crisis-oriented organizations such as the military or fire department, there is considerable 
evidence that the most appropriate style would be high task and low relationship, since 
under combat, fire, or emergency conditions success often depends on immediate 
response to orders. (Hersey et al., 1996, p. 243) 
 
Application of the tri-dimensional leadership model is appropriate due to the high command and 
control environment required within aviation.  While the ability to adapt to the situation is 




situational leadership style builds a culture where adaptation to the environment allows for action 
and recognition of follower needs.  While the leader may not be the most charismatic, followers 
recognize the rational response to the situation and agree to follow the leader.  This resulting 
action builds trust between leader-follower.  Studies found “the quality of leader-member 
interaction influences the leader's concern for members' welfare, which in turn influences safety-
climate perceptions in the group and hence the safety behavior of the group” (Zohar, 2002b, p. 
76).  The situational leadership model demonstrates through evidence that closer, higher-quality 
relationships increase leader concerns for follower welfare.  This concept provides the base for 
the successful creation of culture and high-trust in organizations. 
Another reoccurring theme in the literature tying aviation to situational leaders was the 
concept of sense-making.  Human nature dictates that individuals interpret activities through 
their own lens.  Interviews of post-accident aviation accidents typically yield differing accounts 
of the same set of outcomes.  Sense-making in situational leadership shifts the evaluation of an 
experience from past tense to instantaneous streams of information evaluated in real-time 
(Roberts & Bea, 2001b).  This concept is repeated throughout the literature and was often 
described as being from a positivist point of view.  Further examples of situational leadership in 
aviation existed within studies of air traffic control organizations.  Two air traffic facilities were 
studied to measure how leader adaptability was handled using various situations, conditions, 
tasks and structure (Arvidsson, Johansson, Ek, & Akselsson, 2007).  These two examples 
provide an example of the strong foundation of situational leadership in aviation. 
Situational approach has its downside.  When Hersey and Blanchard (1996) revised their 
life-cycle behavioral theory 25 years later, they acknowledge numerous gaps in applying only 




situational leadership theory and tri-dimensional models were updated from their original, the 
application remains incomplete due to descriptions for only four out of a possible nine 
dimensions (Graeff, 1997).  Ambiguity caused by the lack of further description allows the 
literature to indicate ambiguity and incompleteness as key descriptors for the situational 
leadership theory.  However, the nature of the dynamic environment in which aviation operates 
and the level of industry maturity demands inclusion of this still popular leadership type.  
Path-goal theory.  The leader member exchange (LMX) construct was first proposed by 
Graen and colleagues as a method to describe and explain the unique relationship between leader 
and follower (Graen, Dansereau, & Minami, 1972; Graen, Orris, & Johnson, 1973).  LMX relies 
upon a strong relationship between members within the organization.  In creating these complex 
ecosystems, groups self-organize based on common goals.  The byproduct of this type of self-
organization is the isolation of out-groups that do not actively follow or fall in line with the 
leader at the top of a LMX organization.  LMX leaders reward members of these in-groups with 
honesty, open exchange of information, and support.  This concept has been identified in 
literature as social exchange based contracts. 
Further literature reveals a more recent trend toward a horizontal version of LMX called 
team member exchange (TMX).  Similar in its relationship between the members, TMX uses 
social exchanges inside work groups rather than between a dyadic leader-follower arrangement 
to identify the quality within teams (Banks et al., 2014; Seers, 1989; Seers, Petty, & Cashman, 
1995).  This latest theory reflects a more modern view of workplace dynamics where teams have 
emerged as centers of organizational power.  The evolution of LMX to TMX provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the potential relationships of aviation to both constructs while 




strong comparisons and can be related by applying proper assumptions (Banks et al., 2014).  
Both LMX and TMX have strong applications and a history of ties to aviation leadership. 
Researchers have identified clear examples of LMX within aviation organizations.  The 
strongest historical example were the leaders of Eastern Airlines.  The first leader of the 
organization was World War I flying ace, Eddie Rickenbacker.  Rickenbacker was frequently 
referred to as having a militaristic style of leadership and often referred to his employees as 
privates (Lewis, 2005).  His blind allegiance to the International Association of Machinists union 
resulted in a series of critical mistakes that shuttered the airline for nearly a month.  Despite 
being the father figure to many within the organization, his leadership style was often a source of 
contention.  Rickenbacker was known to be hard-lined and arrogant, but this behavior was rooted 
in his inferiority of only having a seventh grade education (Berstein, 1991; Lewis, 2005).  
Despite strong command and control characteristics, accidents were frequent during his 28 year 
reign as leader of the airline.  Eastern Airlines flourished under his leadership in the early days of 
aviation where reliability and accidents were common.  The next leader of Eastern Airlines 
reflected the strong ties to military aviation.  Frank Borman was a graduate of the United States 
Military Academy, fighter pilot, and a member of the second class of NASA astronauts.  In one 
of his first actions as the leader of Eastern Air Lines, Borman sent a clear message to the 
employees and fired or demoted 24 vice presidents in a clear attempt to strip autonomy from the 
lower levels of management (Conger, 2000).  While a main objective of profitability was a clear 
mission, Borman often delivered the news to employees in a callous, pessimistic, and rough 
manner.  He frequently relegated employees to menial assignments when they lost favor with 




Transactional-transformational leadership.  Extensive studies linking transactional 
and transformational leadership styles have been performed.  For the purposes of this study, 
meta-analysis of the literature supports the characteristics of both styles are similar enough to 
discuss in one context (McCleskey, 2014).  A summary of literature perspectives on both styles 
will provide a foundation and demonstrate a pattern of evolutionary validation the two are 
inextricably related.    
In a transactional leadership arrangement, the leader and follower enter into a social 
contract to accomplish specific goals and outcomes.  Relationships are formed to maximize both 
individual and organizational advancements through exchanges with gratification components 
for each participant (Burns, 1978).  In this theory, gratification is provided through contingent 
awards such as praise and tangible reward like a promotion, salary increase or bonus.  This 
symbiotic relationship created by contingent reward has been proven to increase organizational 
effectiveness in situations free from complex external factors (Bass, 1985; Bass, Avolio, Jung, & 
Berson, 2003; Bass & Bass, 2009; Gregory, Harris, Armenakis, & Shook, 2009).  After extensive 
study, transactional leadership proved ineffective in developing long term relationships with 
followers and therefore was seen as a short-term solution.   
Bass’ (1985) transformational leadership theory (TFL) has generated considerable 
empirical research interest over the past decades.  The creation of transformational leadership 
stemmed from a perceived shortcoming of fundamental transactional leadership interaction in 
relation to basic worker needs.  Meaningful transformation includes leader interactions that 
include: presenting outcomes in a way where values are enhanced, putting team above individual 
needs, and recognizing others need for recognition (Bass, 1985).  As opposed to the purely 




of charisma by providing followers with inspirational motivation and idealized influence (Bass & 
Riggio, 2006).  Some of the characteristics of transformational leaders include articulating a 
captivating vision for the future, acting as charismatic role models, fostering the acceptance of 
common goals, setting high performance expectations, and providing individualized support and 
intellectual stimulation for followers (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1993; Menges, Walter, Vogel, 
& Bruch, 2011). 
Numerous studies of relationships between transformational leadership and performance 
have been conducted in settings considered stable or free from external influences.  These studies 
are not applicable to the highly regulated, externally rich, and changing aviation setting.  A lack 
of study around dynamic work environments led Bass et al. (2003) to further examine the 
relationship between leadership and performance in operating environments under high levels of 
stress and uncertainty.  Researchers built upon the operationalized notion of relative validity and 
studied other instances of transformational leadership within highly dynamic workplaces.  A 
meta-analysis reported 87 studies with positive relationships among transformational leadership 
and pre-determined organizational outcomes (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  In a sample of 72 light 
infantry rifle platoons, the researchers examined how transformational leadership, transactional 
leadership, unit potency (unit confidence to perform tasks), and unit cohesion (teamwork) 
predicted performance on a training platoon mission.  The results indicated a predictable 
transformational and transactional relationship with an indicated medium correlation of r = 0.44, 
p < .05 (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  Scoring a medium correlation, the stress environments must be 
evaluated individually and not generalized.   
Building on the groundbreaking behaviorists such as Skinner, Watson, and Pavlov, Isreali 




highly complex industrial systems to achieve a higher level of safety.  In addition to creating the 
term safety climate, he studied the supervisory practices in transformational leaders as they 
related to creating safe work environments (Zohar, 1980).  The quantitative study of 427 workers 
repairing industrial equipment in a hazardous workplace revealed a transformational leadership 
based intervention model resulted in a significant decrease in microaccident rates (Zohar, 2000, 
2002a).  This and other research demonstrates the importance transactional and transformational 
leadership in developing a strong leader-follower relationship built on trust.  
Despite the seemingly positive aspects of transactional leadership, the literature cited 
many critics of the leadership style.  Perhaps the most surprising was Bass himself.  The model 
showed deficiencies regarding internal consistency, conceptual contradictions, and ambiguities 
(Bass & Bass, 2009).  Transformational leadership relies greatly on the characteristics of the 
leader, but academic debate continues about reliability and validity of how follower outcomes 
are measured within the leader context.  Yukl (2008) suggested the impact on work groups, 
teams and organizations was unclear due to a lack of weight placed on the measurement of 
variables in previous studies.  The debate will continue on the merits and detractions of 
transformational-transactional leadership, but its presence in aviation organizations is strong and 
will provide a framework to help describe this study. 
Leadership and safety behaviors have been studied in literature often enough to have 
warranted a meta-analysis.  Clarke (2013) examined articles containing any combination of five 
safety dimensions and the term leadership.  Over 800 papers were identified in the search.  From 
that sample, 32 studies identified as having measured leadership using safety variables.  Findings 




participation (p = .44) was stronger in transformational leadership (Clarke, 2013).  Figure 4 
graphically represents the leadership style relationships to safety variables measured. 
Figure 4.  Final model of relationships between leadership, perceived safety climate, safety.  
From “Safety Leadership: A Meta-analytic Review of Transformational and Transactional 
Leadership Styles as Antecedents of Safety Behaviours,” S. Clarke, 2013, Journal of 
Occupational & Organizational Psychology, 86(1), p. 34.  Copyright 2013 by Wiley-Blackwell. 
Reprinted with permission. 
 
The meta-analysis discussion provides great insight into the importance of leader 
adaptation to variables in stating the following:  
The findings indicate that there is empirical evidence to support a role of active 
transactional leadership that is distinct from transformational leadership, suggesting that 
the overall concept of safety leadership needs to be extended beyond the idea of 
transformational leadership to include other types of leader behavior. (Clarke, 2013, p. 
33) 
 
Beyond those findings, the author recognizes several limitations in the body of literature.  There 




Additional limitations exist in the causal link interpretation of the cross-sectional data 
methodology.  As discussed later, this meta-analysis also operationalized safety climate as an 
individual level variable but states there is strong evidence to support treating climate as a group-
level effect.  Aviation requires safety climate and culture to be considered group level in order to 
consider the dyadic unit created as a result of the close work environment and interactions. 
Importance of High-Trust Organizations 
 “Trust between individuals and groups is a highly important ingredient in the long-term 
stability of the organization and the well-being of its members” (Cook & Wall, 1980, p. 39).  
Research consistently showed the relationship between leaders and followers require high-trust 
in a workplace susceptible to organizational accidents regardless of individual leadership traits 
(Cox, Jones, & Collinson, 2006; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Freiwald, 2013; Schein, 2010).  In 
conducting extensive quantitative study, a team of researchers learned five drivers were strong 
and stable predictors of organizational trust across cultures, languages, industries, and types of 
organizations: competence, openness and honesty, concern for employees and stakeholders, 
reliability, and identification (Shockley-Zalabak & Morreale, 2011; Shockley-Zalabak, Morreale, 
& Hackman, 2010).  These characteristics are consistent with early research performed in 
military operations where trust is critical to developing a safety culture and following 
organizational accidents at NASA (Ciavarelli, 2006; Roberts, Stout, et al., 1994; Wong, Desai, 
Madsen, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2005).  
Understanding trust building and the creation of an established theoretical framework for 
leader-follower performance outcomes led to the application of the model to civilian aviation 
related fields.  Commitment to the job, an antecedent of employee satisfaction, was 




(Cho & Park, 2011).  Based on the previously reviewed management theories, the relationship 
between the leader and follower of great importance.  LMX considers trust as a key predictor in 
the ability of an organization to act effectively (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975).  Transactional 
and transformational describes trust as fundamental to ensure exchange of contingent reward.  
Situational leadership demonstrates a leader adapting and formulating a rational response as the 
foundation of trust.  Without trust, each style of leadership weakens.  A comprehensive study 
revealed, from a sample size of 19,849 respondents and p < .001, that trust in management has 
the strongest tie to performance outcomes (Cho & Park, 2011).  Other relative effects of trust 
revealed in the study is included in Figure 5 and serves as a framework for future studies using 
structure equation modeling.   
 
Figure 5.  Antecedents of high-trust organizations.  From “Exploring the Relationships Among 
Trust, Employee Satisfaction, and Organizational Commitment,” Y. J. Cho, & H. Park, 2011, 
Public Management Review, Vol. 13, p. 556.  Copyright 2011 by Taylor & Francis. Reprinted 
with permission. 
 
The literature overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that trust in the organizational 
leader is the foundation for the development of a strong safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Cox et 




there are behaviors required within the organization.  Trust created between human interactions 
becomes a factor in the development of high-trust organizations, particularly through cooperation 
and communication.  This high level of integration of human interaction and trust has been 
supported in the literature through a comprehensive meta-analysis (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 
2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001).  Another critical variable in understanding how high-trust 
organizations form and operate is the complex interaction between humans and machines.  As 
technology advanced, the relationship humans developed with machines changed.  Complex 
processes and systemization of critical tasks have created two methods of dealing with 
uncertainty: minimization and coping (Grote, 2007).  Each have become a factor in every 
operational discussion.  Creation of trust and safety performance within an organization is 
largely determined only when placed in context where trust is conferred (Schobel, 2009).  As 
with aviation, other industries reliant upon technological interaction have similar challenges.  
Historic research emerged further describing these complex interactions within industries where 
the organizational systems and processes failed.   
Organizational Accidents 
Following the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, researchers began to attempt 
understanding the relationship between complex organizational systems and accidents.  The first 
study to explore the interrelationship of increasingly complicated technology and the causes of 
accidents developed into the theory of normal accidents (Perrow, 1984).  Normal Accidents 
Theory proposes tightly-coupled technological systems and unexpected failures are inevitable 
and cannot be eliminated through redundancy.  The adaptation of social science and inquiry into 
human factors, which cause accidents, quickly evolved with the space shuttle Challenger disaster 




undertaken in a series of governmental inquiries conducted by NASA into the shuttle disaster 
tying the accident to organizational level failures (President’s Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, 1986; Wong et al., 2005).   
An organizational accident is defined as a comparatively rare but often catastrophic 
event that occurs within complex modern technology, such as nuclear power plants, commercial 
aviation, the petrochemical industry, chemical process plants, marine and rail transport, and the 
off-shore oil industry (Reason, 1997, 2000).  Much like normal accidents described by Perrow 
(1984), organizational accidents are a product of changing systematic relationships between 
human interaction and technological innovations.  However, the introduction of latent and active 
factors further clarify the organizational accident.  Latent conditions are inherent to all 
organizations and can remain dormant for years prior to combining with active failures or 
external hazards to cause an accident.  Organizational accidents arise not only as a consequence 
of organizational decisions, but also as a result of external decision paths, many of which are 
outside the control of the organization.  Using the space shuttle Challenger disaster, the active 
condition was the decision by mission leadership to ignore the manufacturers’ engineer, Roger 
Boijoly, expressing concern about the O-ring 6 months prior to the launch (McDonald & Hansen, 
2009).  The weather served as the latent condition by dropping unseasonably low the day of 
launch.  Without both active and latent conditions precedent, the organizational accident would 
not have occurred.  Additional research was subsequently performed in order to explain this 
complex phenomenon further and create the comprehensive organizational accident definition.    
The field of study continued to develop and in addition to a formal definition for 
organizational accident, James Reason postulated a model called Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 




specific acts (Reason, 1997; Underwood & Waterson, 2014).  In ordinary circumstances, the risk 
mitigation process, enhanced by the domain layers, coordinate to create a solid mass.  However, 
when either active or latent errors are exposed within each domain at the precise time of an 
incident, the failure is allowed to pass through each layer like Swiss cheese.  Organizational 
accidents using the SCM have been directly related to the aviation industry by using the FAA air 
traffic control system (Underwood & Waterson, 2014).  
 
Figure 6.  Accident system relationships. From FAA Advisory Circular 120-92, (p. 5), by the 
Federal Aviation Administration.  Copyright 2006.  In the public domain. 
 
Reason (1998) also states that when the rare organizational accident occurs, the people 
responsible for those actions often have no comprehension as to the cause.  The FAA quickly 
adopted Reason’s work to aviation and used the SCM to complex techno human aviation 
interactions.  Understanding the root cause and preventing organizational accidents rely upon 
two concepts: production and protection.  Production is an overarching concept related to the 
production of services; in the case of aviation, the transportation of people (Reason, 1998).   
Figure 6 graphically represents the concept of protection and production to aviation as 
described in FAA (2006) Advisory Circular 120-92.  Production in aviation primarily involves a 




in a safe manner relies upon inputs from machine, man, and nature.  Protection relates to the 
institutional methods taken to protect the service from human error (Reason, 1998).  These 
systems can range from simple checklists to a complex computer model mitigating the risk of the 
activity based on input parameters.  Complete systems that address both protection and 
production include an SMS.   
Researchers discovered human factor involvement accelerates the ability for the error to 
occur in most cases (Lindvall, 2011; Taylor, van Wijk, May, & Carhart, 2014; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003).  Human interaction was previously mentioned as a key component in the 
successful development of high-trust organizations.  That interaction serves a critical role in 
organizational accidents as well.  Human factors in aviation is widely accepted by the safety 
community and National Transportation Safety Board as the leading cause of most aircraft 
accidents (Air Safety Institute, 2011).  A field of study emerging within aviation to study human-
system interaction is human factors analysis. 
High Reliability Organization (HRO) 
High reliability organization (HRO) theory relates to enterprises that operate within low 
error tolerances, are committed to a continual reduction in the causes of error, and contend with 
complex technical systems as a normal course of operations (Rochlin, 1993; Schulman, 1993; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  Early adaptations applied HRO theory to industries where 
organizational accidents violated the public trust.  While all industries may have elements of 
high risk operations, there are only a few that have the potential to harm large numbers of people 
in a single organizational accident.  From a scientific approach, an example of a null hypothesis 




function of the degree to which their production technologies are perceived as hazardous or the 
consequences of individual failures vary in severity” (Roberts, 1990b, p. 160).   
There are eight distinct characteristics to help identify a HRO.  They are hyper 
complexity, operational urgency, extreme hierarchical differentiation, complex communication 
networks, high degree of accountability, high frequency of immediate feedback about decisions, 
compressed time factors, and more than one critical outcome must happen simultaneously 
(Roberts & Rousseau, 1989).  These characteristics combine to form a highly complex 
interrelationship as described by Perrow, Reason and Roberts.  Researchers believed there was 
more to understanding HRO behavior and proposed in conjunction with the University of 
California at Berkley the creation of a working group called the “HRO project”.  “The HRO 
project then sought to explicate phenomena which are surprising and unexpected - as well as 
skeptically received as incredible within the scope of current social science understanding of 
complex organization” (La Porte, 1996, p. 61).  Figure 7 represents the culmination of the 





Figure 7.  Conceptual logic undergirding HRO studies. From “High Reliability Organizations: 
Unlikely, Demanding and at Risk”, (p. 62), T. R. La Porte, 1996, Journal of Contingencies & 
Crisis Management, 4(2).  Copyright 1996 by Wiley-Blackwell.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
HROs are not necessarily high-risk organizations by nature, but rather take extraordinary 
measures to achieve error-free performance (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).  Reliability is 
an extremely hard standard to reach.  Regardless of previous success, HROs operate in an 
environment which demand continuous predictability.  Unfortunately, organizational accidents 
cannot be offset with previously successful performance; they do not have the ability to be 
credited to the next event (Schulman, 1993).  An examination of literature on the lessons learned 
from HRO research provide a relevant framework in which to understand organizations 
operating within an industry that demands error-free performance.   
Evolution of HRO theory.  As described earlier in the context of organizational 




within the HRO.  The theory remains actively debated in HRO literature as to whether 
exogenous influences can be effectively integrated or whether the highest degree of reliability 
exists in a closed system free from trial and error (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989; Weick, 1987; 
Weick et al., 2008).  In contrast, many HROs believe trial and error leads to a better 
understanding of how systems fail and the human interaction necessary to disrupt organizational 
accidents (La Porte & Consolini, 2008; Rochlin et al., 1998; Schulman, 1993).   Those 
advocating trial and error believe experimentation increases system understanding which in turn 
increases the human ability to intervene appropriately.  In articulating the position that trial and 
error is the only way to achieve true understanding, Rochlin (1999) made the following 
argument: 
The maintenance of safe operation so defined is an interactive, dynamic, and 
communicative act, hence it is particularly vulnerable to disruption or distortion by well-
meant but imperfectly informed interactions aimed at eliminating or reducing ‘human 
error’ that do not take into account the importance of the processes by which the 
construction of safe operation is created and maintained. (p. 1549)  
  
The debate in literature will continue as to whether it is truly feasible to achieve error-free 
performance in a HRO through predefined processes and systems versus trial and error.  The 
application of this argument to aviation has been clearly resolved through extensive 
experimentation in activities ranging from airborne flight testing to the constant adjustment of 
checklists by manufacturers.  Regardless what position the literature argues, there is compelling 
evidence to support aviation has a rich history in applying the concepts of HRO to a wide range 
of activities.  
HRO in military operations.  In a quest to understand organizational accidents on a 
massive scale, a more focused field of research applying HRO theory to military flight 




Naval aircraft carrier operations (La Porte, 1996; La Porte et al., 1988; Roberts, 1990a; Roberts, 
Stout, et al., 1994; Rochlin et al., 1998; Weick & Roberts, 1993).  Due to the high number of 
fatalities of carrier-based aircraft, the Navy undertook a project to determine root causes and 
create a high performing safety environment.  Researchers described the high-risk environment 
of carriers could have applications in any area containing complex processes and human-systems 
interaction.  Mishaps peaked in 1953 with 57 accidents, but through the continued diligence and 
increased process analysis, the mishaps steadily decreased to 15 by 1965 (Roberts, 1990a).  The 
incredible success reported in the study represents high validity since the accident rates 
continuously improved through 2013 when the accident rate fell to 0.48 per 100,000 hours 
(Naval Safety Center, 2014).  Many of the lessons from this literature informed future research in 
other industries. 
HRO within NASA.  HRO theories and concepts quickly became adopted and ingrained 
into NASA due to a series of unfortunate accidents (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Casler, 2013; La 
Porte, 1996).  Beginning with STS-51, space shuttle Challenger, NASA and researchers began to 
study the institutional level failures that occurred.  In using STS-51 as a representative model, 
Reason (1997) was able to accurately describe organizational accidents.  Unfortunately, it was 
not until the second accident of STS-107 and the loss of vehicle and crew of Columbia in 2003 
that NASA acted in response to extremely critical identification of organizational failures (Boin 
& Schulman, 2008; Mahler & Casamayou, 2009).  HRO research took the fundamental concepts 
of organizational accidents and evaluated the situation for its relationship with characteristics of 
other activities requiring failure-free operations.  NASA operates in an environment where risk is 
inevitable.  The complexity involved with basic components of space travel such as the vehicle, 




(Casler, 2013; Mahler & Casamayou, 2009).  Add the large number of decision makers and 
operational urgency to the process and it matches all the previous criteria previously stated.  
There was also a tight correlation between leadership, culture, and safety at NASA (Norelli, 
2015).  Later research describes the method in which NASA has rejected integration of HRO 
concepts into organizational culture development.  In operationalizing 10 components of HRO, 
NASA was found to fit only four (Casler, 2013).  The failure to recognize a need to integrate 
HRO thinking is troubling after two very high profile organizational accidents that led to the 
eventual de-funding of multiple re-entry space flight.  Failures at NASA may have facilitated 
other governmental organizations to fully embrace HRO concepts.    
HRO in the FAA Air Traffic Control system.  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has utilized the HRO theoretical model in air traffic control operations.  At the time of 
adoption by the FAA in 1982, several high profile mid-air collisions had occurred, a controller 
strike had just occurred, and the agency was in the process of a technology update (Schulman, 
1993).  Management was seeking a solution to redesign the organizational culture to achieve 
greater reliability and keep pace with aviation technological advancements.  In order to ensure 
success, the FAA understood full implementation would mean not only an organizational 
change, but a policy change (O’Neil & Krane, 2012).  Air traffic controllers have highly complex 
reciprocal interdependencies between pilots, systems, and even other controllers (Busby & 
Iszatt-White, 2014; Nævestad, 2009; Roberts & Bea, 2001a).  This tightly coupled 
interdependence creates a dynamic workplace ripe with potential for organizational accidents (La 
Porte & Consolini, 2008; O’Neil, 2011).  Using the mitigation tactics of HRO allowed the FAA 
to understand the organizational subtleties that cause accidents and eliminate them.  By 2000, the 




fatal accident rate (O’Neil & Krane, 2012).  HROs are inherently concerned with reliability over 
performance, therefore the FAA example proved no different to NASA, nuclear power plant, and 
aircraft carrier aviation operations in demanding adherence to both at the same time.         
HRO adoption in commercial aviation.  After the clear success of HRO theory within 
military operations and the FAA, the concept gained favor in commercial aviation.  Prevalence 
of hiring participants from these two early adopters allowed airlines to re-evaluate their 
operations from a new perspective, but the adoption was slow in coming.  The identification of 
commercial aviation as a HRO has also been studied and well-grounded in literature.  The 
empirical results from the literature demonstrate the ability of HROs to reduce the number of 
errors (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013; Roberts & Bea, 2001a).  In a 68-year study of commercial airline 
operations and accident rates, the advent of HRO theory proved statistically significant.  “Our 
analysis of the American aviation policy-agency regulatory framework revealed a statistically 
significant relationship between the emergence of specific high-reliability policy and the 
regulatory agency characteristics that produced a reduction of commercial airline Part 121 
accidents” (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013, p. 609).   
Commercial aviation has a long history of hierarchical deities in the cockpit known as 
pilots (Rochlin, 1999).  The mere nature of the official designation of ‘pilot-in-command’ 
provided little ambiguity as to who was ultimately responsible for the operation of the aircraft.  
However, the human relationship evolved into a more complex system as the level of 
cooperation necessary to operate the aircraft increased (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  In 
addition, increasing technology in flight systems removed the predictability and simplicity of the 




systems.  Now highly complex engine power plants and advanced navigation avionics proved an 
inability of humans to effectively understand the infinite variability. 
A clear criticism of the literature is that no one appears to dispute the presence of each 
HRO characteristic within aviation, but no empirical research conducted support such claims.  It 
appears the reliable and valid measurement tools used in military outcome analysis or various 
other fields has not resulted in meaningful study of HRO practices in commercial aviation.    
HRO in healthcare.  Since the establishment of HRO organizational theory, numerous 
industries have joined the quest to achieve error-free operations.  Healthcare has been the most 
recent entrant into HRO due to the parallels in imagery between aviation operations and 
medicine to the consumer.  Examples in clinical operations have been well researched and have 
shown successful outcomes (Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003; Singer, Rosen, 
Zhao, Ciavarelli, & Gaba, 2010).  One study went so far as to compare safety related attitudes 
and experiences of 2,989 California hospital employees in 15 locations to 6,901 members of 
naval aviation units.  The conclusion was the hospitals lacked a strong HRO characteristics in 
comparison to the Naval Aviators (Gaba et al., 2003).  This result was not unexpected since the 
hospitals did not claim to have fully implemented HRO and the Navy has been a self-proclaimed 
HRO for over 20 years.  Researchers were not satisfied with the results from the first survey and 
many of the same investigators participated in a more wide-scale evaluation using the same 
question set.  In the second study, 13,841 hospital workers and 14,854 naval aviators were 
administered the same survey with significantly different results.  One hospital performed at the 
same level of the Navy and at least one hospital outperformed the Navy in all but 3 of the 16 
benchmarks (Singer et al., 2010).  The study results prove the ability of HRO theory application 




Table 3 represents other industries experimenting with HRO application along with those 
previously mentioned as having pioneered the effort (Binci, Cerruti, & Donnarumma, 2012). 
 
Table 3 





Examples of organizations 
targeting high reliability 
Fire emergency services To prevent, prepare for, respond to and 
recover from a diverse range of fire 
emergencies 
US wildland and urban fire 
fighting 
Healthcare To ensure effective performance and 
safety with results close to zero error 
despite operating in unpredictable 
environments and organization being 
inherently risky 
Loma Linda Hospital 
Kaiser Permanente 
Power grid To maintain reliability of power grids 
and guarantee electric service 
continuity avoiding service 
interruptions and blackouts 
Norwegian electricity network 
operators  
California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) 
Air Traffic Control To effectively manage the air traffic 
flow with safety of flight operations 
and avoid possible disasters 
Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Air Traffic 
Control Centers 




Space Flight To reach new and unknown places for 
the benefit of humanity in conditions 
of safety and reliability 
Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (CAIB) 
Railway sector To provide a safe, fast and reliable 
transport service 
UK train operators 
Petroleum and chemical 
industries 
Research, production, transportation 
and marketing of oil and natural gas by 
avoiding natural disasters and 
minimising organisational risk 
Chevron 
Nuclear power To provide low-cost electricity in a 
safe, clean and reliable way 
Diablo Canyon Power Plant 
Note.  From “Resistance in HROs, Setback or Resource?” D. Binci, C. Cerruti, and S.A Donnarumma, 
2012, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 25(6), p. 868.  Copyright 2012 by Emerald Group 





HRO as a construct.  Various stated examples of successful implementation of HRO 
have proven the applicability of the theory.  The continued debate highlighted by the literature is 
the lack of conceptualization of key reliability characteristics such as culture, technology, 
structure, and collective mind (Nævestad, 2008; Offstein, Kniphuisen, Bichy, & Childers, 2013; 
Roberts & Bea, 2001a, 2001b, Rochlin, 1996, 1999).  Scholars refer to these core characteristics 
as sociotechnical systems.  Sociotechnical systems approach relies upon jointly optimized 
technical and social subsystems.  This tightly coupled system allows the primary task to be 
accomplished with the highest degree of efficiency (Nævestad, 2009).  There is little argument 
that HROs, and by default sociotechnical systems, rely upon a high degree of shared beliefs and 
expectations.  With the tightly coupled human systems, the hypersensitivity to prevent failure 
results in unwarranted simplification and creation of rigid processes that jeopardize HRO 
effectiveness (Roberts & Bea, 2001a; Weick et al., 2008).   
Any time a pilot or other participant in HRO relies upon rote memory to perform tasks, 
the system has failed.  Studies prove the danger of collective mindfulness is rooted in the fact 
that HROs have so few accidents it results in unrealistic ideas and over-confidence (Offstein et 
al., 2013; Rochlin, 1999).  In a series of maritime examples, one study used the Titanic as an 
example of this contradiction to HRO philosophy.  Everyone from the captain to the dishwasher 
was told the Titanic was unsinkable and therefore created a false sense of fantasy based on 
unrealistic ideas.  The crew had little training in the massive ship and based decisions based on 
efficiency rather than reliability (Roberts & Bea, 2001b).  “In the more effective HROs, 
complacency is interpreted as a failure of striving, inattention is interpreted as a failure of 
vigilance, and habituation is interpreted as a failure of continuous adjustment” (Weick et al., 




HRO conclusion.  Each example included in various settings underscore a broader point 
of how a HRO theory integrates with organizational culture.  The goal for every HRO is to 
achieve organizational reliability.  Weick (1987) states that the Challenger accident, Three Mile 
Island, and Bhopal were all organizational issues related to reliability and not efficiency.  The 
unintentional result is efficiency inherently creates an organizational culture of unreliability.  As 
system complexity is introduced into an organization, the human must match that complexity and 
account for a variety of possible variables to achieve predictability (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; 
Schulman, 1993).  This predictability, whether in human behavior, systems, or processes serves 
as a critical component to create organizational reliability, a key component to a successful 
HRO.  Therefore, we must examine the concepts of organizational culture and how the 
environment to sustain a HRO can be created.  While integration of culture to organizational 
accident is not mentioned in Perrow (1984), the literature suggests a strong connection within 
HRO.  This would account for an updating of the basic theory to cover additional variables 
uncovered during subsequent studies.  Criticism has been voiced as to the unintended diversion 
resulting in a rush to solve the argument whether HRO and NAT are related (Roberts, 2009).  It 
is clear from meta-analysis the two have similar overlapping characteristics, but are in fact two 
distinct theories.  Taking into consideration the body of literature on HRO theory, perhaps one 
quote can accurately summarize the entire field of study:  
While the conceptual problems of interdependence and complexity have been part of the 
social science agenda for at least twenty years, this work is still in a very early stage of 
development when set against the organizational phenomena being observed. (La Porte & 
Consolini, 2008, p. 74) 
 
Organizational Culture and Climate 
There is substantial scholarly debate as to whether aviation safety can be categorized as 




change (O’Connor et al., 2011).  Surprisingly, the literature is unclear as to whether the existence 
of strong organizational safety culture impacts accident rates.  There are strong examples in 
measurement of safety culture in the military, but this has yet to be applied to general aviation.   
Organizational culture.  Organizational culture is a broad term established to explain 
the interrelationship between leaders, followers, and the organization.  To state organizational 
culture is a frequently studied topic would be an understatement; in a WorldCat search using 
organizational culture as a term, over 24,000 peer-reviewed articles appear.  Researchers have 
been actively searching for a clear definition of culture and attempting to understand the impact 
to organizations from a sociological, psychological, and anthropological perspective.  Culture 
has been discussed in the context of organizational development for many years, but the 
academic literature did not apply scientific rigor to the topic until its peak in 2011 with 1,882 
peer-reviewed articles.  The relative infancy of organizational culture research as a phenomenon 
has allowed researchers to explore a great deal of related topics. 
The creation of a high functioning, nearly error-free organization relies upon elements of 
centralized processes, but also development of a successful culture.  Interpretation, 
improvisation, and unique action are all necessary for highly dynamic operating environments 
and without organizational culture, there would be no inability to adapt (Weick, 1987).  Due to 
the high number of articles on the topic, studies have formulated unique definitions of 
organizational culture over the years.  Researchers continue to frame the conversation in a way 
that is beneficial for them.  One recent study cited 164 different definitions for organizational 
culture (Fisher & Alford, 2000).  Despite the ongoing debate, the literature has accepted a 
definition of organizational culture proposed by Schein (1990):  
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given 




integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to 
be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. (p. 111) 
 
Schein (1990) explains further that Lewinian field theory cannot explain the complex 
relationship of organizational subgroups and units.  Therefore, a return to a natural state of 
equilibrium is impossible due to the amount of dynamic social systems, or culture, within an 
organization.  
Early research into organizational culture focused on identifying how it was created, 
communicated, and rooted using a single workplace.  Due to the measurement of culture being 
very subjective and from a sociological viewpoint, studies relied heavily on qualitative analysis 
(Büschgens, Bausch, & Balkin, 2013; Denison, 1996; Marchand, Haines, & Dextras-Gauthier, 
2013; Schein, 2010).  This myopic research agenda created a large volume of studies on the 
theoretical limits and conceptual development of organizational culture, but very little on 
measurable outcomes.  It was not until recently that literature began to research differences in 
culture and how they affect the organization. 
Since organizational culture is a variable in the behavioral outcomes of followers, the 
effect of a strong culture could stifle innovation.  In a meta-analytic review of 43 studies 
examining 6,341 organizations, the effect of a strong culture impacting both radical and 
incremental innovation was found to not be statistically significant in hindering the innovation 
process (Büschgens et al., 2013).  This finding lends validity to HRO theory of enhanced 
performance when a strong organizational culture is present.  The lack of impact in innovation 
allows the follower the freedom to interpret and adapt to changing environments to avoid 
catastrophic failures (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  Effectiveness is also a key driver to successful 




measure effectiveness has become a central question in the research.  Various opinions have 
emerged as to what constitutes effectiveness since the multidimensional nature of operational 
criteria differs between organizations and individual decision makers (Denison & Mishra, 1995).  
It is therefore nearly impossible to measure effectiveness in a context that is meaningful to the 
body of literature.  One meta-analytic review looked at 84 studies to measure overall 
effectiveness using dimensions specified by the Competing Values Framework.  Each dimension 
utilizes a recognized element of organizational culture to effectively categorize the 
characteristics but lacked any tangible measure.  The study found that positive correlations in 23 
out of 25 possible effectiveness measures (Hartnell, Ou, & Kinicki, 2011).  Despite the 
shortcomings of measuring effectiveness, these two meta-analysis examples prove the presence 
of a strong organizational culture leads to higher effectiveness and innovation than those without.  
   In the end, organizational culture must be evaluated in its most basic form.  The 
literature must temporarily set aside the philosophical argument of whether it is sociological, 
psychological, normative, pragmatic, or anthropological (Brinkmann, 2007; Edwards, Davey, & 
Armstrong, 2013).  For this and other studies, organizational culture has been viewed in the 
context of a variable acting as a subsystem within human, process, and organization interaction 
driving the outcomes like an invisible hand.  The magnitude of complexity and interdependency 
of organizational culture has proven too much for the literature to draw meaningful conclusions 
and assumptions.  A few aviation related studies lacked empirical meaning, or used conjecture 
for effect to describe another industry.  
Organizational climate.  Organizational climate can be regarded as the surface features 
of the culture attributed to leader-follower attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time.  It is 




work group, plant, or organization (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000).  A major 
distinguishing factor highlighted in literature relates to climate is a lack of organizational 
memory and therefore can be easily changed or manipulated by leaders.  “Climate refers to a 
situation and its link to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational members.  This it is 
temporal, and subjective” (Denison, 1996, p. 644).   
In order to highlight and summarize the various theories of thought of climate versus 
culture, Table 4 provides additional insight as to how the literature treats the two distinct 
theories.  Many researchers distinguish the differences using the temporal orientation and level 
of analysis characteristics.  Organizational climate only touches on the surface-level 
manifestations of a particular phenomenon, where culture attempts to seek understanding of the 
underlying values driving the behavior.  Schein (1990), the recognized founder of organizational 
culture, articulates his struggles with the very question of how to distinguish the two.  He 
resolves this conflict by making a general statement that climate can be considered a cultural 
artifact comprising several concepts (climates) in order to adequately describe the situation 
(Schein, 2000).  
 
Table 4   
Contrasting Organizational Culture and Climate Research Perspectives 
Differences Culture Literature Climate Literature 
Epistemology Contextualized and 
idiographic 
Comparative & nomothetic 
Point of View  Emic (native point of view) 
 
Etic (researcher’s viewpoint) 





Differences Culture Literature Climate Literature 
Level of Analysis Underlying values and 
assumptions 
Surface-level manifestations 
Temporal Orientation    Historical evolution Ahistorical snapshot 
Theoretical Foundations Social construction; critical 
theory 
Lewinian field theory 
Discipline Sociology & anthropology Psychology 
Note. From “What is the Difference Between Organizational Culture and Organizational 
Climate? A native’s point of view on a decade of paradigm wars,” D.R. Denison, 1996, Academy 
of Management Review, 21(3), p. 625.  Copyright 1996 by Academy of Management Review.  
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
High reliability organizations like aviation are not resilient when only operating as an 
organizational climate.  Evidence from the HRO literature overwhelmingly supports culture is 
superior to climate (Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995; Nævestad, 2009; Roberts, Rousseau, et al., 
1994; Rochlin, 1999).  Much of the early literature on organizational climate infers culture is 
similar without distinction.  The purpose of describing distinct differences in literature is to 
prevent interchangeable use of organizational climate and culture.  It is especially important 
while introducing the concept of safety culture.  
Safety Culture 
Based on the pioneering work of Perrow (1984), Pidgeon (1991), Reason (1998), and 
Schein (1990), the field of organizational culture found clarification and purpose in creating the 
subset known as safety culture.  “The safety culture of an organization is the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and 
safety management” (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 191).  Placing culture in an organizational context 
allows for qualitatively thick description.  The need to avoid catastrophic failures gave rise to a 




organizational accidents.  The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) first 
described safety culture to reflect on the operational and human failures at Chernobyl.  The 
report stated, “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and 
individuals that establish an overriding priority” (INSAG, 1991, p. 1).  As with any emerging 
theory of thought, there is significant dispute in literature as to how to define safety culture.  
Guldenmund (2010) summarizes the literature well and captured the diversity of thought as 
represented in Table 5.  The inconsistency in the definitions used by the studies reflects a 
continued debate.  Due to the complex nature of safety culture and the sociological interactions, 
two schools of thought emerged to provide constructs and potentially solve the uncertainty: 
functionalist and interpretive approaches. 
 
Table 5 
 Definitions of Safety Culture 
Author(s) Definition of Organizational Safety Culture Part* 
Deal & Kennedy, (1982) 
but used by numerous 
other authors also in the 
field of safety Cox 
The way we do things around here M 
Cox & Cox (1991) Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that 
employees share in relation to safety 
C 
INSAG (1991) Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals that establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance 
C 
Pidgeon (1991) The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices 
that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, 
customers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious 
W 
ACSNI (1993) The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s health and safety management Organizations with a positive 
safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, 
by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the 




The concept that the organization’s beliefs and attitudes, manifested in 






Note.  * The part of culture the definition primarily focuses on; C = core, M = manifestations, W = whole.  From 
“(Mis)understanding safety culture and its relationship to safety management,” F.W. Guldenmund, 2010, Risk 
Analysis, 30(10), p. 1467. Copyright 2010 Society for Risk Analysis.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
Functionalist approach.  Scholars have identified the functionalist approach to safety 
culture as shared patterns of behavior (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Nævestad, 2009).  These shared 
patters are collected qualitatively through surveys of a variety of stakeholders within the 
organization.  In many cases, researchers interpret the data subjectively and construct scales in 
order to articulate the study findings.  A functionalist approach sacrifices reliability in favor of 
observational richness and context (Nævestad, 2009).  For researchers skilled in the industry or 
familiar with the human factors being studied, identification of shared patters and a functionalist 
approach may be preferred.  Safety culture research has traditionally been conducted through a 
social and organizational philosophy lens (Guldenmund, 2000). 
Interpretive approach. Interpretive approach to culture assigns order and meaning to 
organizational phenomena.  Scholars draw upon anthropology theorists to understand culture as 
shared systems of meaning where humans interpret their experience through a theoretical lens 
and guide their action based upon those interactions (Nævestad, 2009).  They understand culture 
as shared patterns of meaning that members of organizations draw on as they interpret their 
beliefs, behavior and collective identity (Alvesson, 2012; Glendon & Stanton, 2000).  
Author(s) Definition of Organizational Safety Culture Part* 
Geller, E.S. (1994) In a total safety culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety and 
pursues it on a daily basis 
M 
Berends (1996) The collective mental programming toward safety of a group of organization 
members 
C 
Guldenmund (2000) Those aspects of the organizational culture that will impact on attitudes and 
behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk 
C 
Hale (2000) The attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining 
norms and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to risks 
and risk control systems 
C 
Richter & Koch (2004) The shared and learned meanings, experiences, and interpretations of work 
and safety—expressed partially symbolically—which guide peoples’ actions 
toward risks, accidents, and prevention 
C 






Interpretive analysis of safety phenomenon excel at revealing how meaning is applied to 
patterns, motivations, and preventative measures. 
Safety culture as a construct.  Safety culture has been described in management 
literature as a systemic, structural, and static construct (Pidgeon, 1991).  The basic premise of 
safety culture creation is the ability of the organization to align policy and action.  Safety culture 
relies upon the development of high-trust and leader-follower relationships to be effective.  
Organizational culture exists as a part of the entity, therefore an organizations is rather than was 
and created as a result of historical actions that formed the culture (Guldenmund, 2010; Patankar, 
Bigda-Peyton, Brown, & Kelly, 2005).  The social contract established to provide reward, 
whether in transactional, path-goal, or situational leadership, relies on the enacted policies being 
supported for safety culture to be effective (Zohar, 2008).  It was not until Reason (1997) 
specifically created a series of criterion that safety culture gained wide scale acceptance.  He 
proposed the following characteristics: 
• has a safety information system that collects, analyses and disseminates 
information from incidents and near misses, as well as from regular proactive 
checks on the system; 
• has a reporting culture where people are prepared to report their errors, mistakes 
and violations; 
• has a culture of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded to provide 
essential safety-related information, but also in which it is clear where the line 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is drawn; 
• is flexible, in terms of the ability to reconfigure the organizational structure in the 




• has the willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety 
system, and is willing to implement reform when it is required. (Parker et al., 
2006, p. 552) 
 
This construct had been accepted until reflective analysis was performed of existing literature 
and a new shortened safety culture construct was created.  Four elements were identified in the 
new model: management concern, personal responsibility, peer support for safety, and safety 
management systems (Flin et al., 2000; Frazier, Ludwig, Whitaker, & Roberts, 2013; 
Guldenmund, 2000).  For the purposes of this study, the new safety culture construct was used to 
provide meaning and frame actions within culture data collected. 
In a comprehensive review of safety culture 30 years after first proposing such a concept, 
Zohar (2010) performed a meta-analysis of academic progress on his topic.  The results were 
mixed.  On one hand, the meta-analysis validated results of previous studies by Zohar (2000) and 
confirmed variation for within-group and between-group safety culture.  This demonstrated 
culture was individualistic in nature.  Safety culture has been lacking research to address the 
organizational hierarchy arising from inconsistent policy implementation (Zohar, 2002a; Zohar 
& Luria, 2005).  The meta-analysis proved qualitatively that no progress had been made in 
solving this issue.   
It is relevant to note that while safety culture in aviation is assumed as a perceived 
necessity and conceded fact, there has been astonishingly little literature written addressing the 
topic (Guldenmund, 2007; Parker et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2013; Zhang, Wiegmann, 
von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002; Zohar, 2010).  Additional empirical research is needed 
in this field to help overcome conflicting theoretical frameworks and complex theories that 




literature as a multi-dimensional concept (Cox & Flin, 1998; Dov, 2008; Fernández-Muñiz, 
Montes-Peón, & Vázquez-Ordás, 2007; Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006; Pousette, Larsson, & 
Törner, 2008). 
Development of Safety Programs  
Researchers have long associated safe operating environments with development of 
safety programs (Hale, Heming, Carthey, & Kirwan, 1997; Pidgeon, 1991; Weick et al., 2008).  
After processing the groundbreaking work of organizational safety theorists, researchers turned 
their focus creating processes to make organizations safety reliable and sustainable.  Human 
error has long been associated with the worst organizational accidents in history and accounts for 
80% of all aviation accidents in history (Gibbons et al., 2006; Reason, 1997).  A reduction of 
human error through methodical approaches to complex processes creates the opportunity for 
safety culture inculcation.  The resulting safety programs originated in energy sector industries 
which required tight coupling of technology and human interaction (Rochlin, 1996; Wold & 
Laumann, 2015).  Generally, safety programs are merely tools for organizations to interact with 
their influencers through advanced communication (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011).  Safety 
programs quickly gained wide-scale acceptance to address all kinds of organizational accidents 
and was embraced as early as 1995 by the International Standards Organization and American 
National Standards Institute (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011).  To further cement the theoretical 
framework of specialized safety programs to highly complex processes, safety management 
systems (SMS) incorporate key organizational functions.          
Safety Management Systems.  An SMS can be described as an attempt to systematize 
safety culture with repeatable methodologies.  Through a culmination of extensive research, 




systems, safety experts, safety committees and quality circles, supervision and behavior 
modification, audits, decision making, and safety culture” (Hale et al., 1997, p. 123).  These 
multidimensional elements merge to define the purpose of developing successful SMS programs 
aimed at preventing accidents.  Several researchers provide an alternative purpose of SMS, 
which is to help the organization meet the regulatory requirements (Cox & Flin, 1998; Hale et 
al., 1997; Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Regardless of conflicting dimensions postulated by researchers, 
the concept of SMS originated from a theory of coordinating mechanisms.  Mintzberg (1980) 
stated that coordination to accomplish a common mission were guided by five tasks: 
standardization of work processes, outputs, skills, direct supervision, and mutual adjustment.  An 
effort to continue Mintzberg’s work and place definitive safety science research parameters 
resulted in the Delft framework.   
The purpose of this is to show what organizational and management factors can be 
introduced or improved in order to improve the performance of the SMS.  The framework 
therefore aims to provide the basis for assessing and improving an existing SMS and for 
designing a new one from scratch. (Hale & de Kroes, 1997, p. 125)  
  
While Delft failed to gain momentum, modern SMS program development continues to follow 
these basic frameworks. 
There is also a general agreement in meta-analytic research that SMS is a means to 
change safety management from being reactive to being proactive (Liou, Yen, & Tzeng, 2008).  
Anticipating hazardous situations before they occur was more important and not just acting after 
an accident has occurred, or phrased differently; to protect against human error (Antonsen, 2009; 
Dekker, 2003; Dien, 1998).  Inclusion and involvement by decision-making participants actively 
engaging in HRO activity improves communication flow throughout the organization.  With 
improvement in communication and involvement, SMS programs are statistically more effective 




Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Meta-analysis overwhelmingly supports the importance of safety culture 
development and its interrelationship with SMS program usage across all industries 
(Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011).  Successful use of SMS specifically in accident prevention within 
HRO operations resulted in aviation industry leaders considering the adoption of SMS. 
Adaptation to of safety programs to scheduled air carriers.  Military aviation 
developed a strong safety culture by using SMS as previously discussed in the context of HRO 
theory.  Civil aviation took notice on the heels of numerous high profile scheduled air carrier 
accidents.  Air carriers operate under Part 121 of the federal regulations, more colloquially 
referred to as the airlines.  The issue was not only airline accidents, but an organizational failure 
to proactively prevent incidents of all types.  While it was in the best interest of airlines to 
become reflective in their organizational practices, it was a 1991 push from NTSB Safety Board 
member Dr. John Lauber who was credited for beginning the safety climate conversation to 
airlines (Kelly, 2013).  As Logan (2008) states, “Before 1995, safety in the airline industry was 
reactive.  An accident or accidents would occur, and, eventually, a mitigation strategy would be 
developed, implemented, and, in most cases, mandated, resulting in an incremental overall 
improvement in safety” (p. S178).  Both airlines and federal regulators understood a change had 
to occur.  The stakeholders created the cooperative Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) 
program to gather useful prevention and safety data from airlines (McFadden & Towell, 1999).  
Airlines voluntarily adopted variations of basic SMS concepts into customized safety programs.  
The success of a cooperative and voluntary airline SMS program cannot be denied.  There have 
been two United States certificated airline accidents out of over 160 million flight hours since 
formal SMS adoption in 2006 and no accidents at all since 2009 (National Transportation Safety 




Researchers have also tied the effectiveness of airline SMS program to safety culture.  
Lin (2012) conducted a quantitative factor analysis of Taiwanese airline pilots and found safety 
culture and performance of a SMS were positively significant by answering the question “The 
safety culture positively affects the performance of SMS” (p. 168).  Similar results in Fernandez-
Muniz et al. (2007), McNeely (2012), Byrnes (2015) found SMS serving as a key dependent and 
independent variable for behaviors leading to sustainable safety culture.  The intensive airline 
SMS design and its associated complexities were visually demonstrated as an impact relations 
map in Figure 8.  Commonly referred to as the safety triangle, the graphic demonstrates 
interrelationships identified by researchers using mathematical evaluation of system design and 
accident data (Liou et al., 2008).  Unfortunately, the extent and complexity of SMS programs 
established for airlines have minimal application to the limited CNATO industry segment human 




Adoption of safety programs to general aviation.  While logic would suggest the reduction in 
airline accidents would suggest wide-scale implementation to all sectors of aviation, including 
CNATOs, there is a lack of literature to support any effort undertaken.  Some suggest business 
aviation is embarking on an effort to implement voluntary SMS programs (National Business 
Aircraft Association, n.d.).  The FAA continues to encourage all operators to use SMS and other 
safety culture tools, but has stopped short of mandating it through regulation.  International 
guidance has been more far-reaching and comprehensive. 
Dating back to 2001, the ICAO had been working to establish the Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) for adoption by the organization.  The impetus for SARPs was 
in direct response to the desire by member countries to enact a comprehensive safety 
management system across all aircraft operations.  United States based CNATOs were 
Figure 8.  Airline SMS impact relations map.  Shows dependencies of an effective SMS 
program.  From “Building an Effective Safety Management System for Airlines,” J. J. H. 
Liou, L. Yen, and G.H. Tzeng, 2008, Journal of Air Transport Management, 14(1), p. 24.  




repeatedly asking FAA officials how to effectively conduct operations internationally in ICAO 
countries.  In response to mounting pressure, the FAA issued Advisory Circular 120-92A, 
mirroring the more stringent requirements created by ICAO and changed the advisory circular 
previously created for airlines from “Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air 
Operations” (FAA, 2006) to “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers” 
(FAA, 2010).  The revised document outlined the components of a SMS, but lacked specific 
guidance on SMS development.  CNATOs were left to use customized SMS solutions or 
commercially available solutions from a highly fragmented market (Cacciabue, Cassani, Licata, 
Oddone, & Ottomaniello, 2014).  Effectiveness of the limitless amount of SMS programs in 
CNATOs has not been examined in literature.   
Accident rates in aircraft operators.  Research suggests that airline accident rates on 
their own are not a predictor of future accidents (Liou et al., 2008).  Latent factors have been 
given minimal consideration to help define casual relationships of accidents.  Human behavior is 
inherently unpredictable and therefore accident data can only represent trends that may influence 
failures.  Complex system factors such as those found in aviation are inextricably entwined.  
Existing literature support the linkage of HRO, safety culture, and leadership to accident rates in 
commercial operators (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Placing strict 
context on how accident data is analyzed can eliminate improper assumption as to whether 
factors are directly or indirectly mutually related.  
Sources for gathering accident data for the study has been traditionally limited to publicly 
available sources such as the NTSB, FAA, and industry groups.  However, the literature has 
often suggested adaptation of military rates to other aviation industries (Desai et al., 2006).  




circumstances, CNATOs do not act in a similar manner to military operators, nor are there many 
commonalities in organizational structure.  Researchers agree that factors pertaining to other 
HRO industry segments are not easily translated to CNATO operations (Cooke & Szumal, 2000; 
Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Scott, Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 2003).  
Summary 
The study seeks to find similarities and relationships between highly established CNATO 
operational dimensions and variables.  Existing literature, or in some cases a lack of academic 
and industry literature, has provided insight into leadership characteristics, high-trust 
organizations, organizational accidents, HROs, organizational culture and climate, safety culture, 
SMS, and instrumentation.  A synthesis of theoretical frameworks emerge from further 
examination of each topic comprising study programmatic themes.   
What has emerged from the literature review were three overarching themes to guide the 
study.  First, an almost absolute of certainty exists in literature that leadership affects follower 
compliance with safety culture and organizational accident prevention.  Additionally, the 
literature was close to certain of strong organizational culture creating a foundation for safety 
culture effectiveness and reduction of organizational accidents. Finally, artifact creation and 
implementation through SMS development and implementation effects organizational accidents 
to a fair degree of certainty. 
The varying degree of certainty with which the literature addresses each of these 
intervening and independent variables provides a springboard to investigate the research 
questions, primarily:  To what degree does each variable have on its own to affect organizational 




Wide scale adoption of core theoretical concepts used in literature regarding aviation 
safety culture, organizational accidents, and HRO served as an exciting discovery.  
Groundbreaking social science work exemplified by Wiegmann, Reason, and Roberts 
respectively in their fields provided invaluable insight.  Theoretical frameworks described in the 
literature review allow further research an opportunity to investigate highly specific relationships 
between variables such as the one explored in this study.  However, a lack of healthy academic 
debate regarding specific aviation industry drivers within those frameworks served as a potential 
limitation.  Literature topics within the study used comparative rather than contrasting analytic 
methods due to the homogeneity of thought.  Identification of this limitation and concluding 





Chapter III: Methods and Procedures 
Restatement of Research Problem 
The Chapter II literature review demonstrated CNATOs operate in a high-reliability 
organizational environment where safety culture and programs are necessary to prevent 
organizational accidents.  HRO analysis of United States Naval carrier operations and adaptation 
of SMS programs in airlines have dramatically reduced accidents in those two applications.  
Unfortunately, there has been little scientific or academic focus in determining safety culture 
factors in CNATOs.  In an effort to seek further understanding, this study employed an 
ethnographic method to explore insights and experiences of participants. Through ethnography, 
data collected provides insight into values held and allows general patterns to emerge.  Probing 
participant experiences in operating a CNATO placed in context with variables leads 
understanding the research questions.  The purpose of this study is to (a) examine the way 
leadership introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety 
culture is implemented by followers, (c) investigate the types of artifacts used by the aircraft 
operator to provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determine the extent to 
which safety culture has an effect on organizational accidents. 
Accident rates in CNATOs have continued at levels high in contrast to scheduled airline 
operators - 0.157 per 100,000 flight hours for scheduled airlines and 1.02 per 100,000 for 
CNATOs (NTSB, 2015a).  The CNATO accident rate is more than six times that of the 
scheduled carriers.  Identification of relevant factors may assist in reducing CNATO accidents to 
a rate closer to that of airlines.  As these statistics suggest, CNATO safety culture may lack 
consistency and provide an opportunity to examine various factors that influence a reduction in 




culture, SMS implementation, organizational culture, and regulatory influence enhance CNATO 
operational safety and mitigation of organizational accidents.  Integrating both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in an examination of CNATO activities more accurately identify 
relationships between variables than a single investigative method.  This chapter articulates the 
selected research methodology, including the process for selecting data sources, instrumentation, 
quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures, and human subject consideration. 
Restatement of Research Questions 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the study employed quantitative methods to address the 
following questions: 
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess? 
(descriptive) 
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with 
performance outcomes, including accident rates? (relational) 
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use 
safety management system programs and those that do not? (comparative) 
4.  To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the 
development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational)  
Research Design and Rationale 
This quantitative study’s ultimate purpose was to inform policy as to how CNATOs 
develop strategies used to operationalize framework components and maximize the efficacy of 
safety culture.  A combination regression and multivariate analysis study required development 
of a more comprehensive understanding toward both depth and breadth in CNATO operations.  




indicated the degree to which responses allowed identification of comparison and contrasts 
between respondents.  Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) advocated a combination of 
“quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language 
into a single study” (p. 15).  Another practical application for study approach was the use of 
abductive reasoning.  Abductive reasoning utilizes the experience, expertise, and intuition of 
researchers and applies both deductive and inductive skills to answer the research questions 
(Wheeldon & Åhlberg, 2012).  This study will benefit from a comprehensive examination of 
quantitative data through a sequential transformative method of research approach. 
Sequential transformative design.  A sequential transformative design employed “a 
two-phase project with a theoretical lens overlaying the sequential procedures” (Creswell, 2009, 
p. 219) .  Sequential mixed method data collection involved collecting data in iterative phases.  
Iterative data collected in one phase contributes to data collected in subsequent phases, 
effectively creating a sequential model.  The 'sequential' portion of the research design entailed a 
quantitative organizational climate and safety survey to clarify numerical trends and obtain 
relevant artifacts.  The next phase used qualitative leadership measures to understand how 
leadership influences organizational climate and safety.  The 'transformative' portion involves 
reviewing the results from a CNATO leadership lens, which will produce meaningful correlation 
to organizational accident rates.  Creswell (2009) asserted that the sequential transformative 
strategy allows the researcher to provide context for diverse perspectives and better advocate 
participants’ worldview.   
SCI/SMS (quant) + MLQ (quant) + SMS (quant) Accident Data (QUANT)
 




The four research questions encouraged methodological triangulation; no single method 
adequately addresses the four questions.  Multiple perspectives gained by using sequential 
triangulation aid in guiding subsequent phases due to “the results of one method are essential for 
planning the next method” (Morse, 1991, p. 120; Richards & Morse, 2013).  Triangulation 
validates results using a mixed method context to determine variable impact on accident rates.  
This design creates dominant versus equal paradigm emphasis.  One single method did not 
prevail as an important dimension and determine weight and sequence.  Design of this study 
included both concurrent and sequential time order decision design, as well as equal and 
dominant status paradigms.  Figure 9 graphically represents the order and importance of the 
study instruments that guided research design.  The sequence of research represented within 
Figure 9 shows activities performed first beginning on the left and time ordered left to right.  
Each concurrent data set revealed a more detailed understanding of the research question and 
provided context for the sequential collection stage represented right of the arrow.   Due to the 
mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, capitalization represents a higher weighting of each 
instrument in their importance answering the research questions.  Special attention to 
legitimation of data collected frames research actions.  The legitimation step involved assessing 
the trustworthiness of both the qualitative and quantitative data and subsequent interpretations 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Selecting a sequential transformative strategy allowed the researcher to provide context 
to answers provided by CNATOs prior to drawing conclusions on variable relationships to the 
accident data.  Performing qualitative and quantitative investigation in phases enabled the 





CNATOs are dynamic social organisms developing over time influenced by internal and 
external forces.  Examination of the research questions identified a set of dependent, intervening, 
and independent variables for further study.  Taking a social constructivist view of CNATO 
culture development framed the research.  In general, social constructivists seek understanding of 
environments in which participants experience culture development.  They “rely as much as 
possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2009, p. 8).  While 
the constructivist view shaped the method, a factorial design using interaction effects also 
influenced the approach.  Identification of an interaction effects design and assists in later data 
analysis by accounting for spurious or negative interaction.  Experimental mixed method 
research of CNATOs using qualitative and quantitative instruments to gather variable 
information allowed comprehensive research question coverage.    
Qualitative method.  A qualitative, ethnographic component benefited the study; it 
enabled the collection of background information on participants to construct an overall setting.  
The ability to show patterns and processes demonstrated through values, beliefs, and practices of 
CNATOs fit an ethnography typology (Richards & Morse, 2013).  Measuring CNATO 
interaction and experiences with predetermined variables using specific qualitative instruments 
provided the data necessary to develop these patterns.  Comprehensive variable experience 
inquiry also provides comparative context within the industry and peers.  Qualitative inquiry 
regarding leadership architype measures gave key data information on dependent variable 
relationships.  Employing the interpretive explanation typology of qualitative findings allowed 
full exploration of emerging participant patterns.   
In contrast to findings that survey topics and themes without linking them, or that 




interpretive explanations offer a coherent model of some phenomenon, or a single thesis 
or line of argument that addresses causality or essence. (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2003, p. 
914) 
 
Techniques within the research questions use require experimental ethnographic design 
techniques.  Qualitative method will allow identification of variations between responses and an 
opportunity to differentiate CNATO safety compliance approaches.  Third, leaders in charge of 
implementing the safety programs have varying degrees of experience.  The behaviors of the 
leader is of particular importance to understand the context in which CNATO implemented SMS 
and safety culture inculcation.  Finally, leader aptitude will potentially have an impact on 
whether a safety system is effective or not.  Each of these phenomena will be further 
operationalized using ethnographic methods. 
Data gathered used the industry standard MLQ-5x Short Form survey instrument 
measuring 9 factors designed by Avolio and Bass (1995).  Collection of data occurred over a 3-
week period via online survey tool Qualtrics.  As described in previous summaries, a first level 
analytical style places the user inside the context of an aviation safety program.  Next, thick 
description using a comparison of the various safety programs and their differences provided 
further context.  It was presumed each CNATO used their own technique of implementation and 
effectiveness inside individualized leader and follower groups. 
Quantitative method.  Aviation is a science, and as such, the study benefited from the 
use of statistical quantitative data to answer the research questions.  An explanatory correlational 
quantitative research methodology found simple associations and investigated the extent to 
which variables have an observable relationship defined by magnitude and/or an incremental 
change.  This type of design recognized trends and patterns in data, but it did not seek to prove 




interaction and relationships between variables with no attempt to manipulate independent 
variables.  Explanatory correlational methodology was ideally suited to the study because of a 
need to explain complex relationships of multiple variables.  It is important to note that 
correlational methods cannot determine causality, only a relationship and/or association with 
variables (Chen & Popovich, 2002).  Quantitative data collected in two phases was consistent 
with a sequential transformative mixed method approach.  Two quantitative instruments 
combined to determine whether independent and intervening variables had an effect on CNATO 
accident rates.  
Measurement of organizational safety culture was operationalized and collected in phase 
one using existing instruments which included the SCSMI, a 5-factor, 55-item quantitative 
survey, and MLQ Form 5X-Short, a 45-item scaled survey.  Numeric data from the Pepperdine 
Qualtrics hosted survey yielded observational data.  Data gathered during the survey informed 
researchers as to basic demographics and the extent to which culture existed within the sample 
size.  This research design ensured relevant data for safety culture triangulation between 
quantitative and qualitative results.  Collection of survey data occur over a 3-week period and 
managed by the web-based software Qualtrics.  Results were exported to Microsoft Excel which 
provided greater ease in data analysis.   
Accident data from the FAA, NTSB, and NASA residing on publicly available 
government websites comprised phase two.  To assist in organizing large amounts of data from 
these sources, each database import into Microsoft SQL used common Primary Keys for ease of 
merging data into one output.  Frequent federal agency crosschecking of information residing 
within these databases ensure reliability.  Maintainers of these resources are full-time employees 




qualitative data and quantitative surveys preceded accident data collection in order to account for 
any organizational accidents occurring after phase one data collection. 
Population, Sample Size, and Response Rate 
The study’s unit of analysis can be defined as a CNATO based in the United States who 
may or may not have experienced an organizational accident.  The study’s population 
represented all FAA certified CNATOs.  Measurement of leadership characteristics and culture 
opinion served as an aggregate descriptor to measure culture development.  Since the analysis 
unit is at an organizational level, aggregated data from individuals served to define representative 
patterns.  The following section describes the process undertaken to define population, sample 
size, and targeted response rate. 
Population.  According to the publicly available FAA Air Operators database, the total 
population comprising all CNATOs in the United States was 2,046 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.).  Table 6 provides a breakdown of total CNATO population by Flight 
Standards Regional Office (FSRO).  CNATOs must comply with an extensive compliance 
proposal and on-site examination prior to certification.  Regulations clearly establish required 
elements under 14 C.F.R. §119, Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, but 
specific guidelines delegated to the FAA Administrator.  A more comprehensive application 
process described in Advisory Circular 120-49 set specific tasks to become a CNATO.  Such 
things as pre-application, initial meeting, invitation for application, formal application, document 
compliance, demonstration and inspection, and certification make the process daunting for any 
potential applicant (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988).  Demographic information for each 






Total Population by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office 
FAA Flight Standards Region (States covered by Region) CNATO 
Population 
Eastern (CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, NC, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV) 311 
Western Pacific (AZ, CA, HI, NV) 300 
Southern (AL, FL, GA, SC, PR) 292 
Alaska (AK) 291 
Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, MN, ND, OH, SD, WI) 253 
Northwest Mountain (CO, ID, MT, OR, UT, WA, WY)  241 
Southwest (AR, LA, MS, NM, OK, TX) 221 
Central (IA, KS, KY, MO, NE, TN) 137 
Total (N=) 2046 
Note: Data taken from “ACTIVEAIROPERATOR” data table contained within Aviation Data 
and Statistics: Air Operators for Compensation or Hire, FAA, n.d.  Database publicly available. 
 
 
Criteria for inclusion.  In order to focus the sampling frame of this relatively large 
population, a purposive non-probabilistic method narrowed the study population by limiting 
inclusion criteria to the following: 
1. Participants represent CNATOs based within in the United States. 
2. Participant organizations certified as a CNATO and currently listed in good 
standing within the FAA Air Operator Certificate Information database. 
3. Participant organizations operating two or more turbine powered, fixed-wing and 
non-seaplane aircraft within the operating certificate. 
4. Participants have one of three title positions identified in 14 CFR 119.69(a) or the 
primary executive leader and only serve in one of the preceding roles. 




Application of inclusion criteria narrowed the total population to 605 eligible participants. 
Sample size.  Study sample size methodology employed a multi-stage sampling method 
utilizing stratified random cluster and systematic random sampling.  Stratified sampling divided 
a population into sub-populations called strata and in each of these sub-populations, a simple 
random sample is taken (Cochran, 2007).  CNATOs earn initial certification by demonstrating 
compliance standards with FAA regulations.  Once awarded, each CNATO reports to a FAA 
Flight Standards Regional Office (FSRO) for ongoing compliance monitoring.  The purposeful 
sample size of participants from three FSROs provided first stage strata data.  Sampling three 
FSROs provided study efficiency by geographically focusing data collection efforts.  Eight strata 
included Alaska, Western Pacific, Northwest Mountain, Southwest, Great Lakes, Central, 
Southern, and Eastern. 
All eight FSROs were entered in an Excel spreadsheet and sorted by inclusion population 
in decreasing value from highest to lowest to determine strata inclusion.  Six fields of random 
generator formulas created a list of numbers from one to eight.  The first three fields generated 
non-reoccurring numbers equating to the line number of a FSRO.  Randomly selected regional 
offices include: Eastern, Southwest, and Western Pacific.  Based on the inclusion criterion stated 
previously and the initial cluster sampling method, potential participants narrowed from 2,046 
total CNATOs to a sampling frame of 289 participant organizations.  The 289 CNATOs shared 
many similar characteristics such as size of operation, revenue, and fleet size.  
Finally, to ensure probabilistic integrity, the study continued with the stratified random 
sampling method.  Proportionate random sampling required taking the sum of each strata and 
dividing it by the sample size.  The resulting formula f = (N1 + N3 + N5) / n yielded a sampling 




selection intervals from the list.  Table 7 displays the data value progression from strata 
population to sample size for each FSRO.  By dividing the sampling frame by the sampling 




CNATO Stratified Random Sampling Methodology 
Strata (FSRO) N Sampling Frame Sampling Integer 
(N / n = f) 
n Strata 
N1 (Eastern) 311 109 11.56 9.43 
N3 (Western Pacific) 300 99 11.56 8.56 
N5 (Southwest) 221 81 11.56 7.00 
Total 832 289  25 
   
A Priori power analysis.  The goal of any study is to reach a high probability and 
confidence level demonstrating any data collected accurately represents the entire population.  
Avoidance of Type I (α) errors, false positive, and Type II (β) errors, accepting a null that is 
actually positive, depend upon factors such as level of significance, power level, and effect size.  
Determining the CNATO sample size necessary to reach statistical significance involved a 
multistep process and was cross-checked using two methods; kMeans and Poisson Regression.   
A kMeans calculator available within SAS JMP Pro 12.2 (JMP) performed a standard 
deviation calculation.  After entering the total population stratified by FSRO, a bivariate fit 
model determined a total population standard deviation of 58.31 and μ = 256.88.  Using the JMP 
sample size calculator with the following parameters, α = 0.05, std(X) = 58.31, and Power = 




this study.  Based on these calculations, a sample size of 25 was statistically significant to 
represent the total population. 
The second validation of sample size calculation involved employing a Poisson 
regression or z-Test.  Additional sample size values used G*Power, another popular statistical 
calculator program. Inputting existing parameters used during previous testing, α = 0.05, Power 
= 0.80, and one-tail modeling, G*Power calculated the sample size of 25 with a critical z of 
1.644 and actual Power = 0.812.  Complete parameters and results from testing are included in 
Figure 10.  Using a z-Test reinforced kMeans results with the sample size as statistically 
significant. 
z tests - Poisson regression 
Options:     Large sample z-Test, Demidenko (2007) with var corr  
Analysis:     A priori: Compute required sample size  
Input:          Tail(s)                                       =  One 
                   Exp(β1)                                     =  1.75 
                   α err prob                                 =  0.05 
                   Power (1-β err prob)                   =  0.8 
                   Base rate exp(β0)                       =  0.7 
                   Mean exposure                          =  1 
                   R² other X                                  =  0 
                   X distribution                             =  Normal 
                   X parm μ                                   =  0 
                   X parm σ                                   =  1 
Output:        Critical z                                   =  1.6448536 
                   Total sample size                       =  25 
                   Actual power                             =  0.8124172 
 
Figure 10.  G*Power test results for sample size. 
 
Participant selection.  While the analytical unit is CNATOs, the hierarchal model relies 
upon individuals to measure organizational characteristics.  Federal regulations require CNATOs 





(a) Each certificate holder must have sufficient qualified management and technical 
personnel to ensure the safety of its operations. Except for a certificate holder using only 
one pilot in its operations, the certificate holder must have qualified personnel serving in 
the following or equivalent positions: (1) Director of Operations (2) Chief Pilot (3) 
Director of Maintenance. (14 C.F.R. §119.69)   
 
Qualifications for each position are further defined in the regulations under §119.71.  Due 
to operational complexity of some larger CNATOs, many have elected to hire a Chief Executive 
Officer.  A key position not identified in the regulations, but serves an important role in 
developing safety culture and internal policy affecting accident rates is the non-flying manager.  
These four influential positions in the organization comprise the CNATO.  The study population 
was comprised of organizations and persons described herein to provide further context to the 
analysis unit. 
The study recruitment of any CNATO key personnel previously described yielded 
meaningful data.  Each have direct responsibility for safe operation of the aircraft and 
organizational accident avoidance.  Solicitation for data collection included all key personnel 
holding one of the following titles within the CNATO: Chief Executive Officer, Director of 
Operations, Chief Pilot, or Director of Maintenance.  Delegation of responding may have fallen 
to a designated safety officer that does not hold one of these titles.  This delegation does not rise 
to the level of snowball sampling due to positional nuances unique to aviation.  Specialization 
often occurs and operational functionality remained the primary intent.  SCISMS instrumentation 
accounted for positional title variations and properly captured substitutions in the demographic 
questioning.    
Human Subjects Consideration 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services established compliance 




based regulations.  Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 C.F.R. §46.101, provides 
compliance guidelines on research study submission to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of 
the Pepperdine University Graduate School of Education and Psychology.  Research conducted 
and designed within this study met the standard for exemption under Category II of the federal 
guidelines.  In accordance to U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources (2009) exempt 
guidelines set forth, the following applies to this study:  
(b) Unless otherwise required by department or agency heads, research activities in which 
the only involvement of human subjects will be in one or more of the following 
categories are exempt from this policy: 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, 
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of 
the human subjects’ responses outside of the research could reasonably place the subjects 
at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. (p. 28012) 
 
The study utilized survey procedures described herein to obtain voluntary information from 
participants regarding operational and organizational aspects of the CNATO.  Study adherence to 
Federal guideline (b)(2)(i) dictated all participants remain confidential and pseudonyms 
immediately documented for all data collection.  Although CNATOs operate in a highly 
regulated environment, inclusion in this study did not expose participants to undue risk.  Due to 
the standardized survey instrument construction, participants’ responses did not expose them to 
criteria outlined in (b)(2)(ii).  Survey results were collected using the online tool Qualtrics and 
stored online via a password protected account only available to the researcher and research 
supervisor.  Within each online survey were comprehensive instructions as to the nature and 
completion expectations of the participant.  Application to the Pepperdine IRB took place after 
dissertation proposal acceptance and a Notice of Approval has been included in Appendix E as 




While ethical issues have the potential to compromise any research project, the study 
provided no personal monetary gain to the researcher; therefore, the likelihood of ethical issues 
was minimal.  All research submitted to participants accurately reflected any study sponsorship, 
clearly stated the purpose of the study, provided a chance to answer confidentially, and requested 
consent.  The nature of this topic involved testing human subjects in an interaction method but 
did not incorporate intervention or private information data gathering.  In accordance to the 
ethical standards, an age verification and method of informed consent statement preceded any 
online survey conducted within this research to ensure compliance with the regulation.  
Participant permission obtained ensures study parameter and guideline acknowledgement.  No 
participants received compensation for their responses.  Any proprietary, copyrighted, 
trademarked, or confidential company information shared during the study remains the sole 
property of the provider.  A copy of the informed consent declaration and outline of risk is 
included in Appendix D.   
Certification from the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) ensured 
responsible conduct of research prior to data collection.  The training raised awareness to avoid 
any ethical conflicts presented during research.  Certification covered conflicts of interest, 
physical science responsible conduct of research, information privacy security, and two modules 
of social, behavioral, and educational researchers (SBE).  Thousands of academic institutions 
recognize CITI as the leading provider of online training for human subject research.  
Instrumentation 
Recent literature suggests a triangulated use of ethnography, case study, and empirical 
methodology has gained favor among researchers to measure safety culture (Glendon & Stanton, 




qualitative and quantitative methods have unique potential for assessment and theory testing and 
that there is a benefit to combining methods to gain a comprehensive understanding of safety 
culture” (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004, p. 129).  For this reason, 
the literature led to an instrument that captures safety culture values quantitatively but allows for 
qualitative clarification. 
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire, Form 5X-Short (MLQ).  A meta-analysis 
conducted by Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicki (2011) made reference to over 4,600 articles on the topic 
of organizational culture since 1980.  Researchers have since developed a wide range of tools to 
measure and assess organizational culture effectiveness.  The goal of such surveys is to assess 
leadership elements in a context when culture is developed as an organization learns to cope with 
the dual problems of external adaptation and internal integration (Schein, 1990).  One of the 
most comprehensive and utilized leadership psychometric tools is the MLQ (Northouse, 2012).  
According to WorldCat, MLQ appeared in peer-reviewed academic works 6,690 times.   
MLQ has been in use for over 20 years and demonstrated both validity and reliability.  
The survey comprised 45 items, including 36 items that represent seven leadership behavior 
factors that measure three distinct leadership archetypes using a 5-point Likert scale.  Given that 
promotion and prevention focused affect differ in their motivational consequences, prior meta-
analytic work supports the differences in predictive validity for promotion and prevention 
focused affect (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008).  Scholarly analysis suggests the MLQ 
demonstrates invariant homogeneous characteristics in various testing conditions.  Results 
testing all nine factors using covariant analysis proved significant where goodness of fit was 
0.93, n = 6,195 and p < .001 (Antonakis, 2001; Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003).  




of the relationship between leader trait affect and leadership.  Overall instrument validity was 
confirmed by meta-analysis using confirmatory structural equation of the nine single-order 
factors (Antonakis, 2001).   
  Using the MLQ allows categorization of CNATO leaders into seven behavioral areas: 
idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualized 
consideration, contingent reward, management-by-exception, and laissez-faire.  From those 
behavior traits, three leadership styles (transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire) will be 
identified and allow for trends between the variables to emerge.  Electronic copyright permission 
to administer the MLQ obtained from Mind Garden allowed up to 300 participants and proof of 
compliance was included in Appendix F.  MLQ Form 5X-Short instrumentation delivery used 
the Pepperdine Qualtrics online survey platform. 
Leadership instrument constructs.  Leadership style in the development of safety culture 
is well represented in the literature (Bass et al., 2003; Schein, 2010; Tsai, 2011; Yukl, 2008).  
Bass and Avolio’s (2003) multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ) version 5X-Short served 
as an instrument used by studies across numerous organizations, including military, business, 
industrial, education, government, and nonprofit organizations.  Researchers agree a reliable 
survey instrument to operationalize leadership factors, comprising the full-range leadership 
theory (FRLT), have been demonstrated within the MLQ 5X as evidenced by WorldCat cited 
inclusion in over 4,300 peer-reviewed articles.  The MLQ 5X serves as a construct to explain 
FRLT, whereby leaders are described on a scale from highly avoidant to highly inspirational 
(Antonakis et al., 2003).  The constructs comprising the FRLT describe three typologies of 
leadership behavior: transformational, transactional, and non-transactional leadership and 




or passive leadership (Bass & Riggio, 2006).  Table 8 describes factors associated with each 
leadership type and a short description of their meaning.  Research meta-analysis posits effective 
leadership was represented when transformational and transactional are used in response to 
organizational challenges (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  
 
Table 8  
MLQ Leadership Typology and Constructs 




To influence the associates as role model in moral 
and value. 
  Idealized Influence 
(Behavior) 
To inspire associates to achieve the goals by extra 
effort. 
  Inspirational Motivation To communicate their vision and mission, 
identify the right and important things and find 
the ways to achieve the goals. 
  Intellectual Stimulation To simulate associates to question old problems, 
challenge others, think problems in new ways and 
make innovations by their own. 
  Individualized 
Consideration 
To meet associates' individual needs and develop 
them to their full potential uniquely. 
TRANSACTIONAL Contingent Reward 
Leadership 
To set obligations, objectives, and tasks for 
associates, and reward associates when 
contractual obligations are fulfilled. 
  Management-by-
Exception Active and 
Management-by-
Exception Passive 
To check the standards of work to be met actively 
or passively. 
LAISSEZ-FAIRE Passive Avoidant To avoid making decisions, does not take 
responsibility, and does not use authority. 
Note.  From Mind Garden MLQ Author’s Guide, by B. Avolio and B. Bass, 1995, Menlo Park, CA: Mind Garden, 
Inc.  Copyright 1995 Mind Garden, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
 
SCISMS questionnaire.  The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System 
(SCISMS) was the product of a second generation CASS survey tool administered to scheduled 




SCISMS has passed extensive and academically rigorous scrutiny (Gibbons et al., 2006).  
SCISMS has demonstrated both reliability through internal consistency and construct validity.  
Review of the instrument has demonstrated overall fitness with results of a RMSEA = 0.04 
where χ2 (27, N = 427) = 452.29 and p < .001 (Gibbons et al., 2006).  The study has obtained 
permission from a private company to administer the SCISMS to aviation organizations 
identified in the sample size discussion.   
  This instrument utilizes a 7-point Likert scale to measure organizational commitment, 
formal safety indicators, operations interactions, and informal safety indicators.  The 
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), a previous application of the SCISMS survey, 
measured safety culture within Part 121 airline operators.  Recognizing CNATOs operate 
differently, the original CASS survey included CNATO participants to ensure validity.  Inclusion 
of CNATO participants recognize SMS nomenclature, safety techniques, and collection 
methodology, and therefore the SCISMS application is logical.  Use of this survey will also 
allow researchers to draw meaningful comparisons between CNATO and airline results.   
Instrumentation delivery uses the Pepperdine Qualtrics online survey platform.  Due to limited 
distribution, a sample SCISMS survey questionnaire is included as APPENDIX A   
SCISMS SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE.  
Safety culture instrumentation constructs.  As stated previously, academic debate 
continues in meta-analytic data analysis as to whether safety can be categorized as either a 
prolonged state of existence known as culture, or as climate, a temporary state subject to change 
(Clarke, 2013; O’Connor et al., 2011; Patankar et al., 2005; Zohar, 2010).  Whether culture is a 
result of group values (Cox & Flin, 1998), workforce attitudes (Flin et al., 2000), or procedures 




prove difficult to conclusively assess culture.  Frazier et al. (2013) conducted the Safety Culture 
Survey (SCS), a confirmatory factor analysis of core safety culture utilizing a 92-item survey of 
25,574 respondents, and found 12 first order factors.  The SCS was administered to five different 
industries and multiple countries.  As shown in Figure 11, the study concluded safety culture is a 
multidimensional variable with 12 factors influencing safety culture with a CFI = 0.95 and a 
RMSEA = 0.08 (Frazier et al., 2013).  Despite a large number of factors identified, SCS 
nonetheless served as a step forward in identification of relevant safety culture dimensions by 
describing inclusionary categories in the following areas: management, SMS, personal 
responsibility, and peer support (Frazier et al., 2013).  These findings were consistent with 
additional studies which added factors such as organizational culture (Edwards et al., 2013), 
training (Glendon & Stanton, 2000), and organizational lifecycle stage (Guldenmund, 2010) to 
the four categories.  This body of academic work validated the foundation of a measurement 
instrument for aviation safety culture known as CASS.   
CASS represented the first application measuring aviation safety-specific activities.  In 
addition, CASS converted an unmeasurable activity into a quantitative tool.  Factor analysis 
contributed to narrowing previously unwieldy list of 12 contributing factors of previous studies 
into the 5-factor model on measuring organizational commitment, management involvement, 
pilot empowerment, reporting systems, and accountability systems (Gibbons et al., 2006).  The 
groundbreaking work synthesized the previous literature in an attempt to standardize an 
instrument for HROs attributing for a safety culture variable.  Formal feedback to the 81-




121 air carriers.  Questions also included a field for additional comments to allow participants an 
opportunity to clarify or notate further information.  Response rate was 40% with n = 43 surveys 
returned, and concluded “none of the fit indexes for the five-factor model met conventional 
criteria for acceptable fit” (Gibbons et al., 2006, p. 224).  The small sample size limited the 
effectiveness of any confirmatory factor analysis and rendered the results inconclusive.  
Researchers continued to refine the instrument to gain statistical validity.  In a subsequent 
Figure 11.  Meaningful variants of safety culture. SC = Supervisor Concern, SMC = Senior 
Management Concern, WP = Work Pressure, SMB = Supervisor/Management Blame, RB = 
Risky Behavior, IR = Incident Reporting, CO = Caution Others, RF = Respectful Feedback, 
CM = Communication, TR = Training, DC = Discipline, R&R = Rewards and Recognition. 
From “A Hierarchical Factor Analysis of a Safety Culture Survey,” C.B. Frazier, T.D. 
Ludwig, B. Whitaker, and D.S. Roberts, 2013, Journal of Safety Research, 45, p. 24. 




revised CASS study, 503 completed surveys were returned from Part 121 air carriers and a 
confirmatory factor analysis confirmed conceptual revisions yielded high category correlations 
(Gibbons et al., 2006).  Changes made to the original CASS model resulted in a new 55-item 
survey with higher reliability and validity known as Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement 
System (SCISMS). 
The study will employ the SCISMS construct which represents a four-factor model 
reflecting organizational commitment, formal safety indicators, operations interactions, and 
informal safety indicators which are correlated with the personal safety attributes/behaviors of 
the individual (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).  No one factor serves as primary, but rather each 
are interrelated similar to Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese Model.  SCISMS modifications also 
included confirmation of Zohar (2002a) the role of leadership in safety climate promotion.  
Tying key indicator importance to previous safety culture standards provided a context to 
complex interrelationship dynamics within the field of study.  Figure 12 graphically represents 
transitional thinking from Gibbons et al. (2006) on changing the 5-factor CASS to 4-factor 
SCISMS.  SCISMS continues to utilize a 7-point Likert scale with only three anchors identified 
for participants: 7 for strongly disagree, 4 as neither agree or disagree, and 1 for strongly agree.  
An EBSCOhost search shows 11 occurrences of SCISMS in peer-reviewed academic journals 
and five dissertations since released in 2008.  Authors claim additional usage, but the private 




Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS).  Safety data related to the 
operation of aircraft in the United States is available through the Federal Aviation 
Administration information program called ASIAS.  Within the ASIAS program, two key data 
sources were used for the study.  The FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS) contains data 
records for all aircraft incidents and accidents since 1978 searchable by a variety of search 
criterion (FAA, n.d.).   
A second component of ASIAS is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).  The ASRS provides a catalog of voluntary safety 
reports filed by participants in the National Airspace System.  Voluntary reports increase the 
Figure 12.  CASS to SCISMS comparison. Comparative diagram of CASS to SCISMS and a 
factor mapping using interrupted lines connecting core dimensions.  From “Development and 
Initial Validation of a Survey for Assessing Safety Culture Within Commercial Flight 
Operations,” A. M.Gibbons, T.L. von Thaden, and D.A. Wiegmann, 2006, The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 16(2), p. 230. Copyright 2006 by Lawrence Erlbaum 




safety and reliability of aviation processes, are widely referred to as a source of research, and act 
as a precursor to change.  Participants in the ASRS are free to report unsafe situations without 
fear of recourse from other government mechanisms commonly referred to as “whistleblower” 
programs.  The data was verified and a part of the national archival records maintained by the 
federal government.  Data collected through these instruments will provide unbiased information 
to calculate Certificated Non-Scheduled Air Carrier operator safety records. 
Variables.  Table 9 describes the method in which variables will be operationalized using 
data sources and instruments to report data.  Each independent and intervening variable relates to 
the multitude of paths in which participants achieve organizational accident avoidance or 
dependent variable (anticipatory).  To assist in identifying variables and their interrelationships, 
Figure 13 graphically represents the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.  Data 
collection various relationships between variables will be a critical factor in analysis. The 
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Figure 13. Variable path analysis casual model. Demonstrating interaction (and effect, 




Independent variable.  The study included three independent variables: regulatory 
influence, organizational culture, and SMS.  An independent variable “identifies forces or 
conditions that act on something else” (Neuman, 2014, p. 161).  These attributes act 
independently to the other variables.  RQ2, RQ3 integrated the independent variables and their 
effect on dependent variables.  Regulatory influence serves as a constant presence in CNATO 
operations.  No less than three Federal agencies have direct operational oversight and this 
constant oversight provides a foundation upon which CNATOs function.  Regulation also forms 
organizational culture.  Cultural development of CNATOs influence the way safety and 
leadership form.  Finally, implementation of a SMS program determines whether safety cultures 
develop organically or aided by institutionally developed systems.  Each of these independent 
variables share a precursor time value relationship with the intervening and dependent variables.  
The SCISMS instrument captures regulatory influence and presence of a SMS.  MLQ Form 5X-
Short assesses basic organizational culture measures allowing participant level comparison.  
Independent variables identified here help to explain the behavior that lead to CNATO 
organizational accidents.  
Intervening variable.  Literature review demonstrated numerous factors comprise safety 
outcomes (Reason, 1997; Roberts, 1990a; Schein, 1990). The two intervening variables selected 
represent an important bridge between independent and dependent variables: leadership style and 
safety culture.  Intervening variables, or sometimes referred to as mediating variables, “stand 
between the independent and dependent variable, and they mediate the effects of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable” (Creswell, 2009, p. 50).  Foundational research demonstrates 
leadership style and safety culture mediate the independent variables in other industries, but no 




variables effect outcomes.  SCISMS captures four dimensions of safety culture: Organizational 
Commitment to Safety (OC), Operations Interactions (OI), Formal Safety Indicators (FS), and 
Informal Safety (IS) Indicators.  Using SCSMS provides safety culture insight and develops a 
foundation to begin grouping participants in the sequential transformative process.  The MLQ 
Form 5X-Short serves as the industry leading leadership style measurement tool.  The study 
sought understanding of independent variable and organizational accidents relationships 
accounting for leadership style.  MLQ provided seven behavioral areas in which to relate safety 
outcomes.            
Dependent variable.  Organizational accidents in aviation occur in varying degrees.  The 
ASAIS data set captured two types of events; incidents, described as damage to property or 
aircraft, and accidents, characterized by loss of life.  These two organizational accident 
categories require different responses and thus are a determining factor in how leaders and the 
organization respond.  Capturing the type of organizational accident data and comparing 
CNATO independent and intervening variables provided additional insight on safety outcomes.  
The study purpose to examine factors influencing organizational accidents relied upon the other 
variable types to explain influences on the dependent variable.  For this reason, RQ2, RQ3, and 
RQ4 all used dependent variable data examining relational and comparative aspects of CNATOs.  
 
Table 9 
Instrumentation of Variables 
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Data Collection Procedures 
External and internal reliability provide a framework throughout the data collection 
process.  Internal reliability relates to the ability of two researchers to reach the same results 
using the same ethnographic constructs, while external reliability relates to the ability of the 
constructs to apply in multiple settings to achieve the same (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).  




results.  A proposed timeline and data collection checklist was included in Appendix B Data 
Collection Timeline for reference purposes. 
Participant selection.  As previously described within sample size calculations, the 
entire population follows a three-step filtering process.  An inclusion criterion applies to clarify 
CNATOs best matching study parameters.  Next, a stratified random cluster used three FAA 
regions to allow geographic focusing.  Randomization of the membership database entries after 
stratification ensured compliance with proper protocol.  Without randomizing the stratified 
participant data set, unintended weight may have occurred because entries appeared in 
alphabetical order.  Finally, a proportionate random sample selected participants at random from 
the FAA CNATO membership database.  CNATO participant contact information resided on 
publically available FAA Airline Certificate Information database.  These databases provided 
names and contact information for targeted CNATO leaders or those having met inclusion 
criteria to participate in the study.  According to details outlined within the sample size section, 
the random stratified sample size narrowed using a specific proportionate random sampling 
calculation by taking the sum of each strata and dividing it by the sample size.  Randomization of 
database entries after stratification ensured compliance with proper confidentiality protocol.  The 
result of the sample selection formula yielded a formula of N/n or 289 divided by 25.  Thus, the 
sampling formula equals 11.56 with an integer of 11.  Therefore, each eleventh CNATO within 
each stratum were included in the sample size as a participant.   
Initial contact with CNATOs introducing study objectives and goals uses email to solicit 
participation.  Multiple responses from a single CNATO was possible due to various roles within 
the organization responding but did not occur.  These professional aviators will be from the ages 




and will have at least a bachelor’s degree from an accredited university (FAA, n.d.).  Participants 
had sole discretion in deciding whether to take part in the study.  Regulatory agencies and other 
industry groups had no bearing on the ability of participants to take part, as any information 
shared is proprietary to each participant.    
Survey delivery.  Administration of SCISMS and MLQ Form 5X-Short was conducted 
concurrently and follow the described method.  Participants introduced to the study via an initial 
email sent using the stratified and systematic random sampling method.  Upon reaching the 
Pepperdine Qualtrics study portal, participants land on an informed consent page.  Clicking the 
“I Agree” link indicated a participant was willing to participate.  Participants were informed that 
participation is voluntary and they may opt out at any point in time during the study.  The survey 
was interactive and had basic question logic integrated in order to allow participants to opt-out at 
any point.  Participants not responding to the survey request email after 5 days received a system 
generated reminder email.  Those not responding after 14 days from the reminder email received 
a final system generated email notice.  Failure to respond to the final email did not generate 
further emails.  Due to the nature of online survey results, only the investigator knew the identity 
of participants, and pseudonyms reference the participant and their respective organization.  Data 
captured in Qualtrics was stored online via a password protected account only available to the 
principal investigator and research supervisor.  
The MLQ Form 5X-Short was optimized by the copyright owner and authorized for use 
on the Qualtrics platform and memorialized in Appendix F.  Previous instances of SCISMS used 
electronic delivery and had been previously validated for reliability online.  SCISMS survey 
questions included in Appendix A combined with MLQ questions comprised the 106 question 




agreement.  The question order comprised SCISMS then MLQ to build on participants’ logical 
situational thought process.  According to the MLQ construct validation guidelines, combining 
the survey with others does not diminish result efficacy (Avolio & Bass, 2004).    
Organizational accident data collection.  In order to establish key safety factors for the 
representative sample, the study used accident databases containing safety information relative to 
the entire population and a safety culture survey.  Accident data sources were publicly available 
online from the FAA, NTSB, and NASA.  Each data set examined used a confirmatory factor 
analysis to confirm a hypothesized pattern of relationships predicted from the theoretical 
frameworks referenced.  Due to the nature of the intervening variables, the study used 
multinomial regression testing.  This analysis method did not require special consideration nor 
did it affect data collection procedures. 
In order to assist the aviation safety community in accessing information, the FAA 
created an area within the website to consolidate reporting data critical to the safety of flight.  
ASIAS AIDS data contains over 98,356 records of aircraft incidents and accidents since 1978.  
ASRS reporting within the ASIAS accounts for 663,493 records captured since 1988.  Collected 
safety data follows a cross-sectional design from the date of study commencement.  ASIAS 
utilizes a freeze date on all databases to ensure data integrity of snapshot data.  Any data 
collection will occur after the 15th of the month to ensure complete data from the previous month 
is included in the study.  All operational safety data reside on publicly available sources collected 
and reported by the United States government.  As such, consent is not necessary to be compliant 
with protecting human subjects.  The FAA has previously removed any personal information 




Data collection nomenclature.  The study utilized pseudonyms for each CNATO at all 
times.  Participant name assignment followed the convention P^x (strata) followed by x (their 
randomized database row position). Therefore, a convention example would appear as P345, 
meaning Western Pacific FSRO and randomized participant appearing in table row 45.  Upon 
closure of the survey, all data was analyzed and coded by the PI as a large group. Comparing 
anonymous accident/incident data responses and analyzing for matches allowed no identifying 
data existed within the relational database.  Once complete, anonymously categorized data 
emerged using subgroup comparisons based on the factors identified by the survey.  Further, 
subgroupings of commonalities were found and identified using distribution analysis methods.  
Survey results were password protected and stored in a secured via the Qualtrics online tool for a 
minimum of three years. 
Analytic Technique 
Due to the sequential transformative design model, large amounts of data collected relied 
on two primary analytic techniques to describe results from lengthy culture and leadership 
surveys as well as accident data.  Application of meaning to nominal MLQ results using defined 
descriptive techniques allowed meaning behind leadership architypes.  Without analyzing the 
context afforded by descriptive methods and validating multiple data points for each CNATO, a 
definitive conclusion was unlikely.  In contrast, the interpretive nature of traditional quantitative 
analysis using interval scale data tabulation within the SCISMS provided concrete values without 
a need for interpretation.  Despite the mixture of categorical and interval values, logistic 
regression analysis provides a viable measurement method.  “The guiding principle with logistic 
regression is the same: compare observed values of the response variable to predicted values 




Sturdivant, 2013, p. 12).  Since least squares in a linear regression model will not conform to the 
study directional hypothesis, a dichotomous outcome conforms to observed values. Analysis of 
each CNATO data relied upon use interval data tabulation as well as descriptive methods that 
included central tendencies, subgroup comparison, and distribution. 
MLQ Form 5X-Short Survey analysis.  In using categorical descriptive analytic 
techniques, the study will place the reader inside the participants’ setting and time.  The 
construction and aligning of multiple categories using subgroup comparisons and identifying 
patterns among the participants was particularly useful in creating commonality trends.  A series 
of filtering occurred by reviewing the results of the collection after data capture.  Each pass at 
categorical data point values yielded a more refined analysis of CNATO leadership 
characteristics, also called progressive focusing (Richards & Morse, 2013). The goal was to 
allow the data to identify key commonalities and clarify a large amount of information into a (or 
series) of salient points.  These “pieces of the puzzle” were then be fit together to provide a 
“complete, holistic, thick, and rich description of the cultural perspective” (Richards & Morse, 
2013, p. 190).  The result was a monograph of individual participants’ role or thoughts on 
leadership that tie together with others to form patterns.     
Identification of first-level descriptions gathered from participants was critical to form a 
strong foundation in which the reader can gain understanding about the setting.  By analyzing 
central tendencies, survey data yielded answers critical to understanding the context in which 
CNATOs live and operate.  Each participant holds deep knowledge of the setting and personal 
experiences of operating within a CNATO.  Answers to MLQ 5X-Short survey questions created 
abstraction aids in describing the site, situation and setting from participant observation.  




perspective to the study.  Aviation is rich in symbolism and signs.  Semiotics can be described as 
a sign that makes sense in the mind of some person, but may be seen usefully as the connection 
between an expression and a content (Hjelmslev, 1961).  The MLQ survey includes questions 
featuring this method by challenging survey participants to interpret self-reflected actions of 
leaders into participant feelings.  One such example of this would be the question “I re-examine 
critical assumptions to question whether they are appropriate”.  This concept uses leader-
follower dynamic questions within descriptive scenarios on how followers interpret leader 
actions.  Analyzing MLQ nominal values using descriptive methods of central tendencies and 
subgroup comparison insights on leadership characteristics within participant CNATOs helped 
form conclusions on CNATO safety behaviors.   
Quantitative analysis.  To examine the quantitative research questions, the study 
conducted a two-phased data analysis approach to describe differences between CNATO 
operators.  Each research question employed various regression analysis methods to identify 
respondent deviations from statistical norms.  Ultimately, a multivariate logistic regression 
assisted in determining whether leadership influence and safety culture inculcation have a 
relationship to organizational accidents.  Regression is a statistical technique used to predict the 
behavior of an ordinal level dependent variable multivariate intervening and independent 
variables.  This method of statistical analysis for aviation safety has been well rooted in literature 
where safety measurements indicate retrospective causes and understanding of complex systems.  
In logical regression, the dependent variable is the ordered response category variable and the 
intervening variable may be categorical, interval, or a ratio scale variable.  The assumptions of 
linear regression include only one dependent variable and one regression normally distributed 




Poisson dichotomous approach, data evaluation can occur on nominal and ordinal values.  
Therefore, a maximum likelihood estimation for variances and covariance matches study 
objectives for fit (Hosmer et al., 2013). JMP version 12 from SAS Software served as the study 
statistical tool of choice.  Testing included whole model, lack-of-fit and Wald effect tests 
ensuring data fitness in addition to interval-level regression testing. 
Summary 
In order to answer the research questions, a two-phased sequential transformative 
research design guided the study.  Performing qualitative and quantitative data collection in a 
two-phased approach allowed for sufficient analysis of baseline data prior to determining the 
effect of independent and intervening variables on the dependent variable.  Collection of both 
qualitative and quantitative data required individualized collection and analytic methods to 
achieve meaningful analysis.  Figure 9 demonstrated how the study assigns weight and sequence 
to each data set.  This research strategy aided in evaluating a complex set of variables and their 
effect on organizational accidents.  Qualitative instruments used within this study included the 
MLQ survey and SMS information gathering.  Ethnographic research methodology provided an 
investigative foundation for qualitative research methodology while progressive focusing data 
analysis allowed refinement of large information stores into meaningful patterns.  Quantitative 
instruments are the SCISMS survey and multi-agency CNATO accident data.  Explanatory 
correlational research methodology, specifically a multiple logistic regression model, 
investigates the extent to which variables have an observable relationship to explain participant 
data.  Nominal data regression performed during analysis determined the degree of relationship 




variables).  The resulting comprehensive mixed method approach to design, collection, and 




  Chapter IV: Findings 
Introduction 
The goal of this study was to gather information on an inclusionary subset of CNATOs 
using a random stratified sample.  Data collected from these CNATOs helped researchers 
discover attitudes and descriptors that aided in answering four research questions.  Study 
findings represented a three-week collection period survey delivered via online technology.  A 
106-question survey comprised of one qualifying question, five demographic, 55 questions from 
the SCISMS, and 45 MLQ Form 5X-Short questions yielded a response rate of 20 out of 25 
participants identified as the targeted sample size.  Every participant who reached the consent 
page moved forward and indicated acceptance of study conditions.  Anticipated time to complete 
the survey was 18.01 minutes against a stated 20-minute completion time.   
An overview of participant demographics begins the findings chapter to provide insight 
as to study responses.  From there, the chapter followed study sequential transformative design 
methodology where findings are organized by instrument and analyzed individually.  Data 
presented individually provided researchers with an opportunity to examine trends prior to 
forming consolidated conclusions.  Finally, analysis by research question act to tie individual 
findings together having previously presented analysis for context.   
Participant Demographics 
As discussed within the Population, Sample Size, and Response Rate section, the total 
CNATO population equated to 2,046.  The total population narrowed to a sampling frame of 286 
using inclusion criteria and geographically stratified sample method.  An Excel number 
randomizer selected three numbers that corresponded to eight individual geographic regions 




methods created a randomized stratified sampling frame.  Finally, using a priori power analysis, 
it was determined a sample size of 25 was appropriate and valid to survey the total population.  
After submitting surveys to the sample size per participant selection criterion identified within 
Chapter III, the total number of participants was 20 (n = 20).  The difference in sample size 
power of 0.80 to 0.72 between initial study and final analysis to compensate for response rate 
results in an 8.0% higher chance in probability of rejecting the null hypothesis.  However, due to 
the homogeneity of CNATO demographic composition, actual CNATO accident rates per 
operator as reported in government databases compared to sample size, and the nature of 
CNATO regulated operating parameters; the adjusted power value has little impact on study 
conclusions. 
Table 10 graphically represents respondents by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office.  
Of 20 responding organizations, half indicated they have held a FAA operating certificate for 
over 16 years, the other half for between 6 years and 15 years.  An inclusion criterion required 
participant CNATOs operate two or more turbine powered, fixed-wing and non-seaplane aircraft.  
All participants met inclusion criterion.  Four operators indicated 2-5 aircraft on their certificate, 
eight had 6-10 aircraft, and eight operated 11 or more aircraft meeting the criterion.  All of the 20 
participating CNATO representatives were male and their self-identified positions fell into the 
following categories (counts): Director of Operations (6), Chief Pilot (4), Safety Officer (8), and 
Chief Executive Officer (2).  Only one representative from each organization responded.  Based 
on demographic information collected, all responses included participation by someone actively 






Table 10  
Participant Demographics by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office 
FAA Flight Standards Region (States covered by Region) CNATO 
Participants 
Eastern (CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, NC, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV) 10 
Western Pacific (AZ, CA, HI, NV) 8 
Southwest (AR, LA, MS, NM, OK, TX) 2 
Total (n =) 20 
 
In keeping data confidential, study investigators assigned participants aliases.  
Geographic regions remained for comparison purposes only.  The database row numerically 
identifies participants and all original data known only to the researcher on initial entry into the 
Qualtrics survey collection tool.  Therefore, participants appear by strata as P^(1,3, or 5) 
followed by database row number.  An example would be P5 representing the Southwest FSRO 
and database row 1802 expressed as P51802.  The following overview of participants contains 
general knowledge and does not include detailed information beyond roles and organization 
demographical information. 
1. Participant P1143: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Chief Pilot role, Eastern FSRO 
2. Participant P1371: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, performs 
Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO 
3. Participant P1399: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO 
4. Participant P1482: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 




5. Participant P1577: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO 
6. Participant P1750: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, performs 
Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO 
7. Participant P1784: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO  
8. Participant P1921: operates 6-10 aircraft, performs Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO 
9. Participant P11009: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Chief Executive Officer role, Eastern FSRO 
10. Participant P11015: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO 
11. Participant P31098: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO 
12. Participant P31112: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Safety Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO 
13. Participant P31158: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO 
14. Participant P31218: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Safety Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO 
15. Participant P31294: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Chief Executive Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO 
16. Participant P31303: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 




17. Participant P31324: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, 
performs Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO 
18. Participant P31326: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Director of Operations role, Western Pacific FSRO 
19. Participant P51802: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Director of Operations role, Southwest FSRO 
20. Participant P51936: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs 
Safety Officer role, Southwest FSRO 
Research Questions 
The study addressed the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety culture in 
CNATOs has an effect on organizational accidents.  The study (a) examined the way leadership 
introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety culture is 
implemented by followers, (c) investigated the types of artifacts used by the aircraft operator to 
provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determined the extent to which 
safety culture has an effect on overall safety results. Using the following research questions, 
answers to these key themes emerged: 
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess? 
(descriptive) 
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with 
performance outcomes, including accident rates? (relational) 
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use 




4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with 
the development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational) 
Analysis of Findings 
Sequential transformative design as explained by Creswell (2009) and previously 
displayed as Figure 9, allowed for collecting data in iterative phases.  Analysis of data in 
aggregate allowed an organized review of data within a specific lens prior to reviewing within a 
global context.  Phased analysis of each instrument created an individual finding that aided 
understanding of potential interaction between variables.  This method of data analysis fit nicely 
into a traditional logistical regression framework.  Calculation for independence and 
homogeneity of variance of the sample data used Levene’s Test for group comparisons.  The 
resulting Levene’s Test indicated F > 1.798 at α = 0.05 and therefore conclude that there is 
insufficient evidence to claim that the variances are not equal.  
Analyzed data from the SCISMS survey created an overall understanding of 
organizational safety attitudes and characteristics within four dimensions.  Four dimensions 
identified by the survey authors created categories as organizational commitment (OC), 
operation interactions (OI), formal safety indicators (FS), and informal safety indicators (IS).  
Each quantitative measurement provides insight to how organizations perceive and treat safety 
elements, directly aiding to instrumentation of study research questions expressed in Table 9, 
Instrumentation of Variables.  RQ1, RQ3, and RQ4 all relied upon quantitative data gathered 
from the SCISMS survey. 
Examination of MLQ 5X-Short data indicates which type of individual leadership style 
existed within each organization.  An organizational variable value revealed measurable 




author Mind Garden allowed each participant organization to fit within three leadership styles 
and seven behavior traits.  Identification of leadership traits assisted in assigning variable values 
to RQ2 and RQ4.  Specific MLQ 5X-Short data was presented in aggregate due to specific 
copyright requirements by survey authors.  Appendix F specifies only five specific questions 
could be presented within this study.  Therefore, data findings focused on traits and results rather 
than actual survey questions. 
Once organizational characteristics were analyzed, generalized quantitative accident data 
from the ASIAS was reviewed categorized by FSRO.  Prior to survey distribution, a review of 
database information after application of inclusion criteria yielded no participants had accidents 
or incidents since database collection began in 1978.  Since more than half of participants held 
their operating certificates for 16 years or more, any ASIAS entries would appear.  One 
participant organization had an accident or incident according to the data. As a result, specific 
FSRO accident data referenced each organization in the findings for contextual purposes.  RQ2, 
RQ3, and RQ4 used ASIAS data to support interrelationships between intervening variables 
culminating in organizational accidents.  More details about possible relevance of accident or 
incident data appear further in discussion and conclusions.       
Findings 
Findings are presented in various formats due to the large volume of data collected for 
multiple variables and 20 participants aid in creating more comprehensive picture of CNATO 
characteristics.  Sequential transformative design demanded individual evaluation of each data 
set individually prior to applying a specific research question lens.  To assist in creating a clearer 
picture of each individual participant based on their organizational context, data presented by 




the appendices aided clarity when presenting conclusions.  The order of presentation follows 
Figure 9 and chronologically includes SCISMS, MLQ Form 5X-Short, SMS, and ASAIS data.  
Findings directly answering research questions were then presented to synthesize disparate 
elements, represented by variables, into a more comprehensive presentation format allowing 
further analysis.  
SCISMS questionnaire.  Qualtrics presented SCISMS questions to participants and 
described the survey tool as a dynamically generated survey that measured overall safety culture 
at the organization level.  Questions taken directly from the Safety Culture Indicator Scale 
Measurement System (SCISMS) survey appear in Appendix A and use a Likert scale.  Four 
dimensions measured overall safety culture within the organization.  The following quantitative 
data relied upon descriptive statistics to identify broad themes that emerged.  Descriptive 
statistics data gathered by the survey follow categories of formal safety system, informational 
safety systems, operation interactions, and organizational commitment combined into 
organizational dimensions. 
Formal safety system (FS).  Survey results started by measuring formal safety systems.  
These questions centered on organizational uses of safety reporting systems, response and 
feedback safety actors receive from reporting systems, and operationalization of information by 
safety personnel.  Existence of safety management systems demonstrate each CNATO 
organization utilized a SMS.  Table G1 displays formal safety data responses for all participants 
and a μ = 6.12.  Results within this section present verification of broad SMS usage and the 
standard deviation among all 280 participant responses was σ = 0.790.  A value less than one 
sigma indicates very little difference in overall responses across all participants according to 




responding processes.  Safety culture relies upon these tightly coupled systems.  Two outliers 
emerged where μ = 6.14 was below expected.  After performing a MANOVA fit model on 
survey results, P1371 and P31324 were significantly below mean score at r2 = 5.142 and r2 = 
5.285 respectively and therefore warrant observation in subsequent data points for potential 
commonalities.  Figure 14 showed the entire data set least square means results where two results 
fall below other participants.  The following question in Section 5.2 scored the lowest among all 
participants. 
• Section 5.2, Question 4:  Pilots don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls 
since these events don’t cause any real damage 
 
Figure 14.  Formal Safety Systems dimension least square means chart. 
 
A willingness to report all types of potential hazards serves as a critical component of 
safety improvement methodology.  Rationale centers on a basic concept that if CNATOs do not 
have sufficient data, discovering reoccurring issues is impossible.  
Informational safety systems (IS).  SCISMS measured informational systems by focused 
questions related to accountability, pilot’s authority, and professionalism.  Culturally speaking, 
this dimension was one of the most critical since aircraft operations directly relate to these core 




pursuit of excellence through discipline, ethical behavior, and continuous improvement (National 
Business Aircraft Association, n.d.).  The concept of professionalism was included within both 
pre-packaged SMS measures and suggested customized SMS literature as a core element.  
Informational safety responses in Table G2 begin to show unique patterns emerging.  With a 
dimension μ = 5.94, the data reveals participants high reliance and belief in organizational 
informational safety systems. 
Responses in this section begin to deviate from expected results.  An assumption that all 
respondents were pilots, despite not holding a positional title explicitly stating a flying role, may 
be implied.  Deviation in responses centered on survey section 5.5 - Accountability described as 
“These items refer to the ways in which pilots are treated based on their safe or unsafe behavior 
at your organization” and 5.7 – Professionalism described as “items refer to the attitudes you 
perceive among your fellow pilots in regard to safety” (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008, p. 15).  
Despite pilots having a perceived reputation for extreme self-confidence and arrogance, the data 
must be analyzed for its value in determining trends.  Two questions emerged as areas of interest 
due to low mean scores.   
• Section 5.5, Question 1:  Management shows favoritism to certain pilots 
• Section 5.7, Question 5:  Pilots don’t cut corners or compromise safety regardless 
of the operational pressures to do so 
Management showing favoritism and pilots cutting corners scored μ = 5.10 against a 5.94 mean 
for all informational systems.  By running a MANOVA least square fit model, analysis showed 
once again, P1371 and P31324 scored significantly below the mean section score at 4.79 (r2 = 
3.928) and 4.36 (r2 = 4.35) respectively and warrant observation within the research question 




average least square means where N = 14 and DF = 13.  A pattern has started to emerge between 
these two CNATOs based on raw SCISMS data. 
 
Figure 15.  Informational Safety Systems dimension least square means chart. 
 
Operations interaction (OI).  CNATOs are complex organizations with 
interdependencies among various roles.  While pilots are ultimately responsible for the safe 
operation of aircraft, policies set by Chief Pilots, flight parameters and planning performed by 
Dispatchers, and training or instruction received by pilots all have a profound effect on safety 
culture.  Operations interaction data in Table G3 captured participant attitudes regarding these 
interactions.  Non-responses within OI answer banks were intentional and caused by a participant 
selected Chief Pilot primary role.  SCISMS authors believed inaccurate information would be 
gathered by asking those participants to measure a role in which they were directly responsible.  
This approach deserves debate; however, initial academic review provided data reliability and 
validity using this approach. 
An outlier question posed within the Chief Pilot responsibilities demonstrated a mean 
below norms.  When asked about safety reporting habits, respondents believe reporting safety 
deviations to Chief Pilots over the safety department.  This phenomenon was understandable 




extent to which respondents answered where μ = 5.06 provided insight as to the extent 
organizational members had a difficult time relying upon established SMS protocol.  Question 
wording allowed a truthful answer by using “often” as actual verbiage below demonstrates.   
• Section 5.8, Question 5:  Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot 
rather than the safety department 
Survey results in this section centered on actions taken by dispatchers due to below mean 
scores.  Dispatch questions had below mean scores across the all questions in survey Section 5.9.  
The lowest scoring question involved dispatchers sharing information having a value μ = 5.20 
against an overall section where μ = 6.03.  The specific question has been included below. 
• Section 5.9, Question 1:  Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details 
(e.g., weather requirements, NOTAMs) that affect flight safety. 
Overall, Instructors/Trainers scored the highest within this section, μ = 6.38, leaving little 
statistical doubt of their positive impact to safety culture.  CNATOs are required to complete 
recurrent training every 6-months and therefore, some line pilots have more interaction with that 
constituency than any other.  Chief Pilots were slightly above the mean at μ = 6.05 despite their 
exempted answers which presumably would have boosted scores.  Three participants scored 
below least square mean in operations interaction, P1371, P11015, and P31324.  Analysis in this 
category showed less conclusive evidence, as several participants scored below average.  Figure 
16 showed operations interaction dimension less effective in statistically differentiating 
respondents.  At this point in the SCISMS it should be noted two participants consistently scored 





Figure 16.  Operations Interaction dimension least square means chart. 
 
It is interesting to note this section had the highest variance and standard deviation of any 
other section.  Questions contained in operations interaction deal a great deal with feelings about 
others’ role and function as related to safety.  A lack of objectivity could explain this statistical 
phenomenon.  However, the section deviation of σ = 1.092 is not statistically significant to cause 
doubt as to survey results.  In order to verify its fitness, a Chi-square model performed in JMP 
for all responses in this section sought to validate the data.  The results included indicated 
acceptance of a null hypothesis of N0 = the data within the SCISMS OI section is valid with a 
result of p > 0.0423. 
 
Table 11 
Verification of All SCISMS Responses in OI Section 
Model -LogLikelihood DF χ2 p> value 
Difference 10.796731 12 21.59346 0.0423* 
Full 22.547610    
Reduced 33.344342    
 
Organizational commitment (OC).  The final section of the SCISMS survey ask specific 




and management commitment to safety.  Measuring safety culture commitment involved 14 
questions and covered the aforementioned dimensions as displayed in Table G4.  Two questions 
identified areas below mean and attracted further review.  Section 5.11 question 5 discussed 
organizational tendencies to deviate from safety norms.  This question scored μ = 5.40 against a 
section mean of 6.35.  Another question which scored μ = 5.25 against a section mean of 6.13 
pertained to pilot scheduling.  Past safety has been compromised when flight crews were not 
properly rested and this issue was identified by NTSB officials as a necessary improvement area 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2015b).  Both questions are included below for reference. 
• Section 5.11, Question 5:  Management does not cut corners where safety is 
concerned 
• Section 5.13, Question 2:  Management schedules pilots as much as legally 
possible, with little concern for pilots’ sleep schedule or fatigue 
Worthy of note in this section were three non-responses to the questions in Section 5.13 
related to management commitment.  Two of these responses were by survey design because 
they answered as CEO of the participants.  One respondent simply did not choose to complete a 
section displayed on the final page prior to completing the MLQ.  As such, the excluded data 
removed from that section for the participant became necessary.  Survey design allowed 
participants to voluntarily avoid answering questions.  Lack of data in this participant field did 
not affect survey outcomes.  Three participants scored below mean in this section.  P1374 
indicated μ = 5.57, P1784 scored μ = 5.86, and P31324 responded with μ = 5.79.  While P1784 
appears for the first time, the other two appeared as below mean in every SCISMS statistical 




intercept significantly below other study participants.  Based on SCISMS author conclusions, 
these two CNATOs could be at risk for an organizational accident.  
 
Figure 17.  Organizational Commitment dimension least square means chart. 
 
SCISMS dimension summary.  The SCISMS survey provides critical quantitative data 
for participant comparatives.  Four dimensions comprised of 55 questions on critical areas of 
safety culture and gave insight to activities within the 20 participant CNATOs.  Core safety 
elements such as professionalism, management commitment, and functionality of formal systems 
measured in the SCISMS were important to measure inside each CNATO, but also for 
comparison purposes.   
Comparing participant safety dimension mean scores across each FSRO showed very 
little difference.  Table 12 indicated regional differences are not significant enough to justify 
varying treatment in future studies.  Consistently higher than average mean scores across 
dimensions also supported safety culture being familiar to CNATOs.  If CNATO responses 
corresponded to original SCISMS safety culture grid constructs, regions could be described as 
“collaborative”.  Von Thaden & Gibbons (2008) characterized collaborative organizations as 
“safety is seen as a primary integrated concern throughout the organization.  Organizational 




employees informed about matters that affect them.  Leaders are visible and approachable. A 
generative approach” (p. 31).  
 
Table 12  
SCISMS Safety Dimension Responses by FSRO  
 
FS IS OI OC Mean 
P1 - Eastern 6.14 5.93 5.89 6.14 6.03 
P3 - Western Pacific 6.25 5.92 6.10 6.33 6.15 
P5 - Southwestern 6.50 6.04 6.23 6.46 6.31 
 
Table 13 displays participant dimension in one table, allowing easy identification of 
broad themes.  As can be viewed, FS and OC dimensions had higher mean scores than IS and OI.  
Placing data in this format also quickly identified low performers such as P1371 and P31324 in 
comparison to other participants. 
 
Table 13 
SCISMS Dimension Mean Score Comparison 











P11009 6.50 6.64 6.54 6.60 
P11015 6.00 6.14 5.62 6.14 
P1143 6.00 6.00 6.13 6.21 
P1371 5.14 4.79 5.38 5.57 
P1399 6.57 5.64 5.62 6.14 
P1482 6.00 6.14 5.62 6.10 
P1577 6.00 6.00 6.15 6.07 
P1750 6.71 6.79 6.15 6.50 
P1784 6.00 5.79 5.69 5.86 
P1921 6.50 5.36 6.00 6.21 
















P31112 6.50 6.64 6.54 6.71 
P31158 6.57 5.64 6.18 6.36 
P31158 6.00 5.71 6.69 6.36 
P31294 6.50 6.50 6.46 6.60 
P31303 6.43 5.93 5.92 6.36 
P31324 5.29 4.36 5.25 5.79 
P31326 6.71 6.79 6.15 6.50 
P51802 6.50 6.71 6.46 6.71 
P51936 6.50 5.36 6.00 6.21 
 
Mean score over all participants averaged a full point higher in four of five dimensions 
compared to airlines surveyed in the original survey.  Figure 18 shows a comparison histogram 
of CNATO to airline mean scores.  While sample size of the original SCISMS survey was n = 
503 airlines and study only n = 20 CNATOs, demographic similarities with personnel and 
general operating requirements provided valid similarities.  An exception exists in only one 
category.  The μ = 0.30 difference in CNATOs organizational commitment could be attributed to 
SMS programs being newly implemented to this industry segment.  Questions within OC strictly 
addressed management opinions toward safety culture methodologies and processes.  Data 
results indicated an internal struggle between procedural burdens of SMS and operational 
flexibility.   
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire, Form 5X (MLQ).  Specific questions from the 
MLQ cannot be disclosed due to copyright protections imposed by Mind Garden.  As a result, 
generalized data using three suggested qualitative themes has been included.  Descriptive coding 
frameworks in Table 14 demonstrate arrangement according to MLQ leadership characteristic 
descriptions.  Each final coding framework used descriptive data to answer research questions.  It 




labeling a leader.  Therefore, results contained herein provide broad understanding as to leader 
behavior and not meant to label leaders as transformational, transactional, or passive avoidant. 
  
Figure 18.  SCISMS comparison of Airlines vs. CNATO mean score.  Airline data adapted from 
“The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS)”, by the Office of Aviation 
Research and Development, T.L. von Thaden and A.M. Gibbons, 2008. In the public domain. 
 
Table 14  
MLQ Form 5x Leadership Themes  
Final coding framework theme (characteristic) Initial thematic coding framework (scale) 
1. Transformational • Individualized consideration 
• Idealized influence (attributed) 
• Idealized influence (behavior) 
• Inspirational motivation 
• Intellectual stimulation 
2. Transactional • Contingent reward 
• Management-by-exception (active) 
3. Passive Avoidance • Laissez-faire 


































MLQ participant leadership type findings.  In order to understand leadership influences 
on organizations and their willingness to inculcate safety culture, an examination was necessary 
of each participants’ leadership characteristics.  The summary contained in Table 15 represented 
a participant leadership characteristics and dominant scale.  An absence of passive avoidance is 
consistent with the highly regulatory nature of CNATOs and supports previous assumptions of 
passive avoidance leadership being a below normal phenomenon within the industry.  Where 
transactional characteristic was above the norm in five participant organizations, a dominant 
scale of contingent reward (CR) existed in every response.  This phenomenon should not go 
unnoticed and four MLQ questions determined a CR dominant scale.  
    
Table 15 
Participant Leadership Characteristic and Dominant Scale 






























































   
Note. Idealized attributes (IA), Idealized behaviors (IB), Inspirational motivations (IM), Intellectual stimulation (IS), 
Individualized consideration (IC), Contingent reward (CR), Management by exception – active (MBEA), 





Comparing participant geographic strata in Table 16 provides insight as to similarities 
and differences between CNATOs operating in different regulatory oversight FSRO 
jurisdictions.  Generally, higher than normal transformational leadership style emerged as 
predominant within CNATOs across strata.  Transactional appears in two of three stratum.  
Presence of these two leadership characteristics was consistent to literature assessments of 
aviation organizations discussed in Chapter II.  MLQ measures described as outcome of 
leadership were also consistent with high reliability organizations in overwhelmingly selecting 
effectiveness.  Strict focus on compliance and safety heavily rely upon effectiveness over other 
behavioral outcomes.  Extra effort and satisfaction behaviors closely followed in each case.  The 
P1 and P3 strata indicated satisfaction as a behavior outcome while P5 responded extra effort as 
second behind effectiveness.  
  
Table 16 
Mean Percentage of Leadership Characteristics by Strata 
 Participant leadership characteristic percentage 









Transactional 30.0% (3) 37.5% (3)     0.0% (0) 
Passive Avoidant   0.0% (0)   0.0% (0)     0.0% (0) 
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Aggregate responses to MLQ leadership characteristics expressed in Table 16 initially 
seem heavily skewed toward an existence of transformational leadership dominance, but 
examining data further reveals mean transactional data closely follows transformational styles 
among participants.  Table 17 shows leadership characteristic means within strata and by 
comparison to other FSRO participants.  A large gap existed between both transactional and 
transformational and passive avoidant.  The data suggests passive avoidant leadership is not 
prevalent in participant organizations and therefore to the CNATO population. 
 
Table 17 
Comparison of Leadership Characteristics Scores by Strata 
 P1 (N = 10)   P3 (N = 8)  P5 (N = 2) 
Leadership Characteristic M SD  M SD  M SD 
Transformational 4.00 0.1458  4.05 0.1118  3.60 0.2404 
Transactional 3.55 0.7071  3.72 0.3977  3.06 0.4419 
Passive Avoidant 1.45 0.0707  1.41 0.1326  0.88 0.1768 
 
Existence of Safety Management System (SMS).  Previous academic research 
attributed statistically significant decreases in accident rates among airlines upon implementation 
of a SMS.  Participants revealed within Section 5.1 of the SCISMS whether a formal SMS 
existed in their organization.  When responding affirmatively, survey logic inquired whether that 
SMS was commercially available or developed internally.  Each participant response captured in 
Table 18 show all participants have implemented SMS and a high use of commercially available 
programs.  Only P1482 neither used a commercial package nor developed an internal program.  It 






CNATO Use of SMS by Participant 













































































Note.  Commercial heading indicates SMS sourced from for-profit entities specializing in 
providing pre-packaged programs.  Internal signifies participant created SMS in-house. 
 
 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS).  Safety data contained 
within the ASIAS accident and incident database includes any aircraft accidents and incidents.  
The study treats either type of ASIAS entry as an organizational accident due to theoretical 
constructs identifying events within high-reliability organizations, however small, as a process 
failure.  Table 19 expresses ASAIS data for each confidential participant.  The data showed only 
one study participant had any type of organizational accident since ASAIS began collection data 
in 1978.  P31324 incurred an accident in 2014 and an incident in 2006.  Accident investigation 
conclusions suggested controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) as the primary cause.  The accident 




organizational culture or operations elements as contributory causes to the accident.  An ASIAS 
entry was also included for 2006.  Database entry concluded this issue was a gear collapse 
attributed to a hard landing.  No loss of life was noted and airframe was only slightly damaged 
with prop strikes and engine damage.  While this incident is common and appears not to have 
included any organizational accident elements, an 11-year old NTSB report does not speak to 
safety climate that may have existed at the time of the incident.  Generally, NTSB reports are 
limited to facts only and rarely contain supposition or comments which could be construed as 
opinion. 
 
Table 19  
ASIAS Accident and Incident Data for Study Participants 


















































































It is important to note that CNATOs do not include highly hazardous flying conditions 
such as air ambulance or helicopter tours, which have a higher instance of accidents among all 
aviation related groups (FAA, n.d.).   
Findings by research question.  While the raw data provided in the appendices was 
helpful in giving context to participants, the complexity of multiple data points for each research 
question required greater understanding of how data operationalization occurs.  As described 
previously, an instrumentation of variables describes each relevant variable and corresponding 
data point.  Table 9 reappears from Chapter III to assist in understanding section organization of 
findings by research question.  For comparative purposes, P31324 is bolded in each result table 
and represents the only participant who experienced an organizational accident. 
 
Table 9 
Instrumentation of Variables 
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Research question 1.  What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO 
organization possess? (descriptive) 
As described by the study instrumentation table, research question one involves a 
descriptive analysis of participants using SCISMS safety culture dimensions.  Overall mean 
dimension scores and consolidated score provides a general description of CNATOs in a safety 
culture context.  Participants having an above average tendency for formal safety systems (FS) 
indicated a proclivity toward orderly process oriented practices and processes.  Heavy reliance 
on informational systems (IS) suggests command and control methods for safety adherence.  
High operations interaction (OI) scores indicated a more people centric reliance to achieve safe 
operating environments.  Finally, organizational commitment (OC) used leadership and policy as 
the primary motivator for safety culture development.  Each dimension provided insight into 
culture characteristics participant organizations subscribe.  Table 20 shows each mean dimension 




P31802, P11009, P1750, and P31326 ranked in that order.  Bottom quartile mean scores from 
highest to lowest were P1482, P31098, P1784, P1371, and P31324. 
 
Table 20  
SCISMS Composite Safety Dimension Responses by Participant  
Participant FS IS OI OC Dominant Dimension 
P11009 6.50 6.64 6.54 6.60 IS 
P11015 6.00 6.14 5.62 6.14 IS, OC 
P1143 6.00 6.00 6.13 6.21 OC 
P1371 5.14 4.79 5.38 5.57 OC 
P1399 6.57 5.64 5.62 6.14 FS 
P1482 6.00 6.14 5.62 6.10 IS 
P1577 6.00 6.00 6.15 6.07 OI 
P1750 6.71 6.79 6.15 6.50 FS 
P1784 6.00 5.79 5.69 5.86 OC 
P1921 6.50 5.36 6.00 6.21 FS 
P31098 6.00 5.79 5.63 6.00 FS, OC 
P31112 6.50 6.64 6.54 6.71 OC 
P31158 6.57 5.64 6.18 6.36 FS 
P31158 6.00 5.71 6.69 6.36 OI 
P31294 6.50 6.50 6.46 6.60 OC 
P31303 6.43 5.93 5.92 6.36 FS 
P31324 5.29 4.36 5.25 5.79 OC 
P31326 6.71 6.79 6.15 6.50 IS 
P51802 6.50 6.71 6.46 6.71 IS, OC 
P51936 6.50 5.36 6.00 6.21 FS 
 
Three participants exhibited multiple dominant dimensions with instances of identical 
mean scores for each dimension.  It is relevant to note that P11015 and P31098 ranked 15th and 
17th respectively in overall SCISMS score while P51802 ranked second.  Therefore, it cannot be 
said that a presence of multiple dimensions equated to higher overall SCISMS scores.  Further, 
P11015, ranked 15 of 20, and P51802, ranked 2 of 20, shared exactly the same dominant 




with higher overall mean scores.  Data suggests the degree to which safety dimension exists, as 
represented by a higher mean score, was far more important than which dimension was 
represented.   
Using safety culture dimension as a CNATO descriptor may give insight to 
organizational objectives, however, commonalities among participants was inconclusive.  As 
demonstrated in Figure 19, OC appeared the most among participants, but only slightly over FS, 
followed closely by IS.  Therefore, no dominant dimension emerged to describe the entire 
CNATO population.  It can be said about study participants that all scored significantly above 
SCISMS average as a group with μ = 6.16 on a scale of 1.0 to 7.0 where 4.0 represented average.  
 
 
Figure 19.  Study participant culture dimension dominance. Displays a breakdown of number of 
responses to each dominant dimension within the SCISMS safety survey. Participants may have 
more than one dominant dimension. 
 
Research question 2.  To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a 




Reviewing accident data, then comparing trends in leadership characteristics yielded an 
unexpected finding.  Data contained in Table 21, a composite of Table 15 and Table 19, for 
relationships between leadership and organizational accidents yielded information relevant to 
answering the research question.  P31324, the only operator with organizational accidents, 
identified themselves as having transformational leadership behavior above norm.  Due to 14 
other participants exhibiting transformational characteristics and five others with the same 
dominant IM scale not incurring any organizational accidents, no conclusive data can support 
transformational leadership had a relationship to enhanced safety culture.  Further, study data 
indicated to a reasonable certainty IM dominance had no relationship with a higher accident rate 
risk since no accident existed in other IM participants.  
 
Table 21 






























































































Figure 20.  MLQ participant dominant leadership scale.  Compiled from respondents answers 
within each leadership characteristic.  Participants could have more than one scale attributed. 
 
Research question 3.  To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of 
CNATOs that use safety management system programs and those that do not? (comparative) 
SMS programs include formalized, systematic, and methodical processes for aviation 
operations.  These comprehensive written processes serve as the basis for safety culture 
formation.  Presence of CNATO participants with a SMS program indicate basic understanding 
and presence of safety culture.  SMS existence indicated an organization already applied airline 
style safety into normal operations.  Verifying SMS in participant organizations appeared 
through formal safety systems SCISMS questions and a demographic question included by the 
researcher.  Both responses served as a crosscheck during sequential transformative 
individualized findings to insured integrity.   
Table 22 combined relevant data from SCISMS, accident data from ASAIC, and a 




system score, a dimension of SCISMS provided an informal measure as to the extent SMS 
appears across 20 degrees of freedom.  In addition to P31324, which suffered an organizational 
accident, one other CNATO participant scored even lower.  Presence of a lower formal system 
score and the absence of an organizational accident from P1374 provided conflicting statistical 
proof of safety risk.  Since all participants implemented a SMS, any conclusions based on this 
data point would be inconclusive.  For all these reasons, data analysis proved to high degree of 
certainty there is no difference in accident rates of those who use SMS programs and those who 
do not.   
 
Table 22 





















































































































Research question 4.  To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a 
relationship with the development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational) 
Research question four combines each data set into one and asked the question whether 
observed values from participant surveys result in predictable relationship with organizational 
accidents as identified in the ASIAS database.  Using non-experimental research method, an 
analysis of data in Table 23 showed key participant responses for each variable.  Using JMP, 
data analysis revealed some interesting results. 
 
Table 23 



















P1143 Transformational 3.80 OC 6.08 No 
P1371 Transactional 3.55 OC 5.22 No 
P1399 Transformational 3.60 FS 5.99 No 
P1482 Transformational 4.25 IS 5.96 No 
P1577 Transactional 4.00 OI 6.05 No 
P1750 Transformational 3.70 FS 6.53 No 
P1784 Transactional 3.50 OC 5.83 No 
P1921 Transformational 3.75 FS 6.01 No 
P11009 Transformational 4.40 IS 6.57 No 
P11015 Transformational 4.35 IS, OC 5.97 No 
P31098 Transformational 3.60 FS, OC 5.85 No 
P31112 Transformational 3.60 OC 6.59 No 
P31158 Transactional 4.50 FS 6.18 No 
P31158 Transformational 4.00 OI 6.19 No 
P31294 Transformational 3.70 OC 6.51 No 
P31303 Transactional 3.50 FS 6.15 No 
P31324 Transformational 3.40 OC 5.17 Yes 
P31326 Transformational 3.60 IS 6.53 No 
P51802 Transformational 4.60 IS, OC 6.59 No 





The following two figures represent multivariate analysis of leadership characteristics in 
comparison to SCISMS mean score.  Figure 21 represented a multivariate analysis scatterplot of 
transformational responses to SCISMS mean scores.  The trend line and elliptical boundaries 
indicate some relationship among transformational leadership characteristic scale and SCISMS 
mean score.  While there are two outliers out of 15 data points, the reliability value of r = 0.3134 
(existing between -1 and 1) does indicate a predictable trend.  Conversely, a scatterplot for 
transactional responses to SCISMS also had an r = 0.4915 and its five data points extrapolated to 
include predictable values.  However, the research question did not ask simply if there was a 
leader-safety culture relationship.  The addition of organizational accident yielded different 
results. 
 
Figure 21.  Multivariate scatterplot of transformational leadership characteristic. 





Figure 22.  Multivariate scatterplot of transactional leadership characteristic.  
 
Adding the organizational accident parameter to statistical calculations yielded the 
following results.  Figure 23 shows a box plot of CNATO SCISMS mean score responses with 
no organizational accidents overlaid with a normal continuous fit distribution line.  Since only 
one participant experienced an organizational accident, the graphics for results is inconclusive.  
However, it showed a value of 5.17 as mean response.  This value would place it at the lower end 
of the distribution curve, but within the range of values for participants without organizational 






Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI 1-Alpha 
Mean 6.147895 6.009134 6.286655 0.900 
Std Dev 0.348801 0.27542 0.482915 0.900 
     
Figure 23.  SCISMS mean score of CNATOs with no organizational accident. 
 
Considering a leadership characteristic scale using an organizational accident lens yields 
the same result.  Figure 24 represents a box plot of leadership scale averages among CNATOs 
without organizational accidents with the normal distribution line added.  Results for participant 
P31324, the only participant that experienced an organizational accident, scored a 3.40 on the 
transformational scale.  As noted, 3.40 falls well within the normal range of non-accident 
participants, and would fall in the last 10% of those CNATOs.  It is also important to note that 






Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI 1-Alpha 
Mean 6.147895 6.009134 6.286655 0.900 
Std Dev 0.348801 0.27542 0.482915 0.900 
     
Figure 24.  MLQ leader average by scale with no organizational accident. 
 
Despite finding that transformational leadership characteristic can predict SCISMS safety 
culture dimension mean score, the research question asked whether a relationship existed 
between organizational accidents and leadership influence on safety culture development.  Based 
on the data presented, it appears there is no relationship between those variables. 
Summary of Key Findings 
Numerous data points collected using individual instrument resulted in creating 
mountains of data.  Using theoretical frameworks presented in prior chapters, measurements 
yielded definitive results based on specific research questions posed.  Respondents appeared to 
answer survey questions honestly and completely.  The quality of overall data was encouraging 
since 106 questions can sometimes be onerous to complete.  Participants have a commitment to 




study may help identify CNATOs using safety culture best practices and unlock key influencing 
factors. 
Data collected suggests CNATO safety culture best practice existed in several 
participants.  There was ample evidence of data providing mixed or conflicting data when 
attempting to answer research questions.  One such example was P31112 who scored highest in 
SCISMS mean score at 6.59 but last among all transformational respondents with a MLQ Form 
5X-Short score of 3.60.  This juxtaposition revealed itself in RQ4 since 14 other organizations 
scored higher in transformational leadership.  Study results proved that the degree to which an 
organization exhibited a specific characteristic did not correlate to high scores in other measures. 
This chapter presented results obtained from quantitative and qualitative survey 
instruments used to measure safety culture and leadership attitudes of selected CNATO 
participants.  Study findings contribute to a limited body of research focused on increasing safety 
culture within a narrow industry segment that has higher organizational accident rates than their 
airline counterparts.  Major findings and implications to policy, CNATO practices, and 





Chapter V: Discussion and Conclusions 
The final chapter discusses findings in the context of each variable, draws conclusions 
about data sets, addresses implications for policy and practices, and recommends future research 
on the study topic.  Chapter I introduced a theoretical directional hypothesis and discussed 
potential implications should the data suggest relationships exist.  Study findings indicated 
CNATOs are hard to uniformly compare and while organizational accidents were rare, the 
participants were not immune from safety lapses. 
Discussion of Key Findings 
Beyond study research questions was an overall goal to better understand the 
motivations, variable weights, and their relationship with safety culture.  In performing this 
study, it became apparent that CNATO employees directly responsible for implementing safety 
culture have limited exposure to safety leaders.  Based on the results of OI section of the 
SCISMS, participants indicated a strong positive opinion of instructors and trainers.  This finding 
was encouraging and discouraging at the same time.  It uncovered a divide in organizational 
trust, described in Chapter IV as a core component of organizational accident avoidance, 
between CNATO departments.  However, it was encouraging because CNATO pilots undergo 
recurrent training every 6-months and had frequent exposure to instructors and trainers.  
Subsequent sections address this finding in more detail. 
Describing CNATOs was generally not possible in the context of safety culture.  Findings 
suggested that categorizing CNATOs into safety culture dimensions (a) does not determine 
whether they run a higher risk of organizational accidents, and (b) individualized nature of 
CNATOs dictate various approaches to safety culture development.  RQ1 could have uncovered 




not the question asked by RQ2, findings did uncover that CNATOs overwhelmingly characterize 
themselves in transformational and transactional terms.  Of participants responding, 75% 
indicated transformational characteristic and 25% transactional.  None responded passive 
avoidant.   
RQ3 asked a binary question as to whether CNATOs had implemented SMS in their 
organizations.  SMS usage emerged as more important than a mere existence of a program.  
Since the only participant suffering an organizational accident indicated the presence of a SMS, 
the degree to which CNATOs use the SMS became a factor.  SCISMS formal safety systems 
scores were inconclusive in identifying issues related to SMS usage primarily because P1371 
scored below P31324 in formal safety system (FS) mean score, yet had no accident or incidents.    
Therefore, future studies should investigate the type and the degree to which CNATOs use SMS 
as a variable to organizational accidents. 
Perhaps the most encouraging result from the study revolved around a question that was 
not asked, but uncovered because of the study sequential transformative design methodology.  
SCISMS scores of CNATOs identifying as transformational was predictable.  Figure 21 
conclusively demonstrated safety culture scores across all dimensions followed predictable and 
reliable trends.  While there were outliers, respondents were inside the boundaries of the 
scatterplot and JMP multivariate modeling proved reliability was high related to these datasets. 
Examination of Variables 
Leadership.  Literature meta-analysis determined aviation safety culture is best 
cultivated under a transformational-transactional leadership style (Clarke, 2013).  While this may 
be true, data collected in this study does not support MLQ measured leadership characteristics 




on daily attitudes surrounding safety culture.  CNATO employees mostly operate outside direct 
influence from organizational leaders.  Isolation in the cockpit and spending an extended period 
of time away from headquarters lend itself to individualized action.  It makes sense a line pilot 
may only see an organizations leadership once every six months when regulations dictate 
mandatory recurrent training, or at other company-sponsored events.  This lack of daily, direct 
contact places heavy reliance upon hiring practices.  Leadership influence on hiring practices and 
hiring in one’s image emerges as a possible variable not contemplated by this study. 
Study results uncovered a clear fracture among departments within a CNATO.  
Examination of SCISMS OI dimension scores demonstrated an overall distrust of safety culture 
behaviors within dispatch.  Dispatchers are directly responsible for crew scheduling, passenger 
coordination, logistical arrangements, and flight planning.  Data showed dispatch scored below 
OI average across all questions.  While one or two occurrences may be normal, as was the case 
with chief pilot questions, scores below average across all questions raise concerns.  This 
phenomenon deserves closer evaluation in future studies. 
Use of MLQ Form 5x provided a large amount of data as to CNATO characteristics and 
scale.  However, the MLQ instrument did not measure a degree of each scale, only behavioral fit 
within nine constructs.  The degree to which a CNATO demonstrated individualized 
consideration, or inspirational motivation would be helpful to potentially describe CNATO 
operators.  Figure 24 showed scale distribution, but there were several instances where a 
CNATO demonstrated evenly distributed scores across multiple scales.  Therefore, no real 
conclusions emerged about leadership scale and CNATO participants. 
Organizational accidents.  Identification of data leading to avoidance of any CNATO 




subject of an accident/incident or not, data was very straightforward.  Few similarities existed by 
examining data from the only participant to suffer an organizational accident.     
Safety culture.  Conclusions drawn from study data allowed insight as to how CNATOs 
use different strategies to achieve safety culture and to what degree safety existed in the 
organization.  As discussed previously within the findings, P31324 did score lowest on SCISMS 
aggregate scores, but did not score lowest on every dimension.  Data suggested that just like 15 
other participants, they identified themselves as having transformational leadership 
characteristics and like five others identified as having high inspirational motivation scale.  
Safety culture as a construct involves numerous factors and this study attempted to narrow the 
focus to stated SCISMS variables. 
The SCISMS uncovered numerous individualized findings worth noting.  First, dominant 
dimensions identified in Figure 19 resulted in organizational commitment being common in most 
CNATOs.  When looking at the components of that dimension, it included broad organizational 
aspirations as driving culture.  A close second was a more expected result of formal safety 
systems.  Reliance upon humans rather than predicable processes does pose an interesting 
question as to how sustainable safety culture can be when relying upon a human element. 
Another area of analysis granted by the sequential transformative nature of the study was 
within the informational systems dimension.  Scores across all CNATOs were very low in 
professionalism.  Safety culture development relies upon everyone in an organization.  Flying 
passengers for compensation has a high reliance upon professionalism.  Low scores presented a 
concern and were consistent with original airline mean responses being lowest in the IS 
dimension.  This SCISMS dimension may have long-term consequences and would benefit from 




In general, SCISMS survey results failed to relate with other variables to discover larger 
trends resulting in organizational accidents.  However, CNATO data gathered reveled a great 
deal about safety culture attitudes.  As stated previously, scores across the study sample size 
indicated higher awareness than airlines at roughly the same safety culture development stage.  
Figure 18 displayed this achievement in histogram form.  This finding was encouraging and 
exhibited a general understanding of safety culture importance within CNATO operations.   
Safety programs.  Capturing SMS usage through the SCISMS and demographic 
question also yielded unexpected results.  Since CNATO implementation of SMS programs is 
voluntary, expectations existed that not all participants would have already complied.  While it is 
true participants may be more actively involved in safety culture activities due to their voluntary 
participation, the stratified random sample method would equalize any potential bias.  Data did 
uncover that how a CNATO uses an SMS program was more important than a mere existence of 
a program.  Since all operators implemented SMS, any relationship to other variables seemed 
unlikely.  Had a respondent indicated no SMS usage, the study would have been able to assess if 
a relationship existed.  There was no other remarkable information related to SMS program use. 
Conclusions 
Voluminous data collected during this study allowed researchers to reach three 
generalized conclusions.  The study used four bodies of data to answer four research questions 
and attempted to find descriptive, comparative, and relational findings of CNATOs.    
Conclusion 1:  Safety culture within a CNATOs is difficult to describe.  Early in the 
study, Table 5 described the challenge researchers had agreeing on a definition for safety culture.  
Theoretical framework used for this study relied upon an aviation specific construct that 




an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 191).  
SCISMS survey captured these behavioral patterns through four dimensions following exactly 
the Cox and Flin definition.  CNATOs exhibited a strong indication of developing safety culture 
in their organizations as evidenced by Figure 18 where higher means existed in comparison to 
airlines for the same stage in safety program development.  Unfortunately, a pattern did not 
emerge suggesting safety culture was more or less present if certain SCISMS safety dimension 
scores were achieved.  This lack of fit along with a potential for CNATOs to hold more than one 
dominant dimension created a situation where a single conclusion could not be reached as to 
defining an ideal safety culture to avoid organizational accidents.    
Analyzing SCISMS data for each CNATO participant did allow some generalized results 
to emerge.  While the only CNATO to suffer and organizational accident did not score lowest in 
every dimension, it did have the lowest aggregate mean score.  This could suggest that the degree 
to which a CNATO scores on the SCISMS may have a bearing on overall organizational 
accident risk.  In both IS and OC, participant P1371 had lower scores.  Following this participant 
long-term could determine whether a low score had a relationship to at-risk safety behaviors.  
Based on the finding they scored lower than another who already suffered an accident, it seems 
reasonable this CNATO is at risk.  SCISMS measures provide data that FAA inspectors should 
have access to monitor activities and actively engage in accident prevention. 
Conclusion 2:  Sequential transformative design was appropriate.   Research design 
was critical to gain an overall profile of study participants using individualized results.  The use 




over extended study analysis.  When conducting research from afar and not benefiting from on-
site visits with CNATOs, conducting data collection and analysis in sequence was critical to 
gaining an understanding of the participants.  By the time it was necessary to review data within 
the research question lens, an intimate knowledge of each CNATO was already obtained.  RQ1 
asked for descriptions for CNATO using safety culture dimensions.  Placing each into context of 
leadership also allowed an understanding of organizational culture beyond safety constructs.  
RQ2 sought to answer a relational question about organizational accidents and leadership types.  
Knowing that all participants fell into either transformational or transactional assisted in 
determining no relationship existed without much effort.  Sequential transformative design was a 
significant help in gaining detailed understanding of CNATO participants.  
Conclusion 3:  Safety culture, as a broad construct, is hard measure.  The study 
found that while categorization of CNATOs provided an easy way to define characteristics, it did 
not give any insight as to organizational accident predictability.  Using a single survey gained 
valuable data that answered the research questions sufficiently, but use of more than one survey 
may have provided more detail as to safety culture.  Participant fatigue is always a concern when 
designing research and inclusion of The Organization Safety Culture Questionnaire (Kelly & 
Pantakar, 2004), a 50-item survey, would most certainly have been too much for participants.  
Conducting a follow-up survey to the same participants using this measure would give additional 
insight to culture and specifically professionalism.  As identified earlier, responses surrounding 
professionalism were remarkably low in comparison to expected results.  Additional data would 
help clarify SCISMS dimensions to assess whether those have a greater relationship with 




Directional hypothesis analysis.  Figure 3 contained in Chapter I presented a directional 
hypothesis based on researcher general observation and personal assumptions.  The research 
question posed as follows:    
H1: Organizational accidents moderate the curvilinear relationship between safety culture 
and leadership influence in such a way that an intermediate level of detail of leadership influence 
is associated with higher safety culture when the priority of safety is high rather than low. 
Data collected in this study was inconclusive to prove the quantitative research question.  
Conclusive data would have included a larger sample size and response rate including purposeful 
sample size having organizational accidents in the past, but not presently.  One participant in a 
geographically diverse group cannot obtain a level of specificity to answer the question. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
Study implications for policy and practice centered on two constituencies: the CNATO 
and its industry groups, and federal regulators.  Results contained within this study suggest 
actionable steps that effect safety culture.  Focused interaction between researchers and industry 
influencers allow open a dialog about how data is captured, shared, and disseminated.  All 
CNATOs need to participate in the process if any hope exists in creating a near accident free 
environment.  Regulation alone rarely modifies behavior, but industry leaders and groups can 
convince CNATOs widespread cooperation is in everyone’s best interest.   
Commercial safety auditor involvement.  Aviation has long relied upon outside 
agencies to assess and advise CNATOs.  Agencies such as ARGUS International, Wyvern, or IS-
BAO commonly certify CNATOs through a safety audit.  Each of these providers use various 
safety criterion for certification.  A unified, universal, industry recognized measurement tool is 




Anonymous data sets submitted for honest and thoughtful review would help all CNATOs in 
developing best practices and pre-organizational accident prevention identification.  Disparate 
nature of current data does not allow CNATOs to effectively predict at-risk organizations.  
Airlines realized this flaw early on and collectively solved the issue.  Safety auditors have a 
professional responsibility to promote unification of safety measurement tools. 
Impartial safety collection practices.  Non-profit industry groups have attempted to 
address data collection concerns.  Air Charter Safety Foundation created a voluntary reporting 
system called Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).  Presently, there are only 40 participants 
in the program and data is not available to non-members.  These small-scale efforts have limited 
ability to impact safety.  This same type system should be expanded to include all CNATOs and 
made mandatory.  NASA already collects massive amounts of voluntary data through existing 
programs and would be well suited to serve as an impartial conduit for information of this nature.  
Status quo will not change without industry leaders calling for unification of data collection and 
developing solutions.  Airline safety leaders realized this early in the process and a cue from 
their example may be effective in convincing CNATO leaders to adopt similar voluntary safety 
practices and reporting. 
Highly regulatory CNATO operating environments make voluntary reporting programs 
operated by government officials unlikely.  Industry groups serve as a likely conduit to broker a 
mandatory program accepted by CNATO leaders.  Some private safety consultants hold monthly 
calls to allow safety officers a forum to hear others challenges and solutions.  This should happen 
on a broader scale to include the entire CNATO population.  Voluntary programs are effective, 
but psychology proves participants in those programs already value safety and strive to improve.  




who score below average through a common assessment tool such as SCISMS would benefit 
future study outcomes.  Professionalism and accountability mentioned earlier in this study 
continue to play an active role in determining safety culture development.  It is incumbent upon 
every CNATO, potentially through industry groups, to hold every operator accountable to 
professional standards that includes constant evaluation for at-risk safety behaviors including 
variables discussed in this study.    
FAA policy development.  Extensive safety culture development practices developed 
jointly by airlines, regulators, and the NTSB have nearly eliminated air carrier organizational 
accidents (Logan, 2008).  This same level of stakeholder scrutiny does not currently apply to 
CNATOs.  Studies such as this one help to identify factors involved in identifying numerous 
challenges preventing safety culture inculcation.  One clear point gained from this study revolved 
around SMS usage and effectiveness.  The mere presence of a SMS does not reduce the risk of 
organizational accidents.  How it is used and which party developed a SMS program further 
complicates effectiveness.  Many other factors comprise an effective SMS and detailed 
instrumentation addressing overall effectiveness did not appear within this study.  Because the 
FAA is directly responsible for flying public safety, policies should be developed addressing 
CNATO safety inculcation. 
Extensive paperwork is required of every CNATO during certification, including a full 
SMS plan and demonstration.  This review and evaluation occurs prior to the first passenger 
flight.  Very rarely does the FAA review safety programs once an operator obtains certification.  
They require pilot skills be reviewed every six months, aircraft maintenance standards upheld, 
and a myriad of other checks, but safety is only addressed post organizational accident.  Policies 




routine evaluation address current gaps in regulatory oversight.  POIs are FAA FSDO employees 
directly responsible for oversight of each CNATO.  Current POI staffing levels make it 
impractical for routine inspections outside spot-checks or crisis response.  Simply conducting an 
open conversation between CNATOs and POIs about how a safety program is evolving after 
real-life application could help establish best practice.  Properly staffing these positions and 
adding routine assessment of safety culture elements would begin to mark a worthy and 
significant policy change.  
A change in FAA policy to include a standardized instrument such as the SCISMS to 
measure safety culture against averages would serve as a good start in identifying where POI 
best resource allocation to avoid an organizational accident occurs.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
As evidenced by the study literature review, CNATOs received little research focus.  
Safety inculcation and development of safety culture directly effects aviation accident 
prevention.  At some point, the FAA will modify regulations to include mandatory safety 
program usage in CNATOs.  Understanding how airlines succeeded and adapting best practices 
to unique idiosyncrasies of CNATOs provide a blueprint to successful implementation.  The 
following ideas for future research could assist that transition. 
• A study to repeat methods used and adjust inclusion criterion to a purposeful method 
including CNATOs with identified organizational accidents and compare those to 
safety culture best practice organizations.  
• A study using these same CNATO participants and conduct a longitudinal research 
project to determine changes in scores over time and whether low scores identified 




• A study to examine to what extent leaders influence hiring practices and to what 
extent do characteristics of hires mirror that of the leader since CNATO employee 
exposure to organizational leadership is limited due to a unique work environment. 
• A study further clarifying other academic research that examine variable relationships 
between SMS programs and overall safety culture effectiveness. 
• A study to target bottom quartile SCISMS mean score participants within a FSRO for 
more qualitative details on why survey yielded lower than norm results and correlate 
whether organizational accident risk is higher. 
• A study to examine a potential CNATO disconnect in safety culture as evidenced by 
below average SCISMS safety culture dimension scores describing dispatchers. 
Summary 
This study sought to find relationships, describe phenomenon, and seek to describe a 
population that does not get the academic attention it deserves.  Quantitative methodology 
allowed an impartial statistical look into ordinal and interval variable values.  Use of sequential 
transformative collection and analysis provided an opportunity to examine data individually for 
their trends outside a more rigid research question lens.  Data collected during this study was 
interesting and valuable if for no other reason than having never been measured before.  The 
stratified random cluster and systematic random sampling revealed sufficient participant pool for 
data diversity.  While priori power analysis proved study sample size was sufficient, broader 
patterns may have emerged with a larger sample.  Randomization of the sample size 
unexpectedly yielded a CNATO who suffered not one, but two organizational accidents; 
remarkable since CNATO accidents remain rare as percentage of overall aviation accidents.  




organizational accident, did yield a lower than norm score across all instruments.  Findings 
suggest efficacy of safety measures determine the degree to which at-risk organization may be 
valid.  Only further research using a longitudinal research study would determine whether mean 
scores truly relate to increased accidents.  It is worth noting that a further qualitative field visit 
may have also reinforced mean score validation.    
Instrumentation used during the study provided easy to understand and measurable data 
sets.  After testing SCISMS in numerous ways throughout this process, it proved resilient in 
identifying participants consistently in the top and bottom quartiles.  The stalwart MLQ Form 5x 
and its evaluation tools created easily obtained classification of leadership scales.  Information is 
power and there remains no better source of information than aviation regulators and evaluators.  
Making accident data so accessible through ASAIS helped study data become meaningful in a 
larger context.  Hopefully, data gathered through this process can be repurposed and evaluated 
by the five participants who requested a copy of this study.  Expanding future studies to a larger 
sample size represents no harm to CNATOs and benefit the industry.  Therefore, methods being 
sound, examination of each research question could occur based on observed results.        
Finding descriptive commonalities among any group presents challenges and CNATOs 
were no different.  Using 106 questions, the study sought to find similar leadership 
characteristics between 20 participants, but no pattern emerged.  Transformational leadership 
was present in 16 of 20 participants and suggests CNATO commonality with this leadership 
characteristic.  Early in the study, literature identified that transactional and transformational 
leadership types are prevalent in aviation.  That stated fact proved valid through data collected.  
However, as measured against the nine leadership scales, no pattern emerged within either the 




among those who had organizational accidents and those who did not.  None was found.  Despite 
finding no relationship existed, data gathered showed CNATOs were ahead of airlines in 
understanding safety culture importance as shown by higher mean scores at the same stage.  
When complex safety system processes appeared, organizational accidents would be reduced.  
Participant data demonstrated that is not true.  Data showed CNATOs used safety programs 
across all participants, eliminating any distinction indicating a relationship existed.  CNATOs 
seem to understand an implemented safety system provided the first step in cementing 
organizational safety culture evidenced by high formal safety system mean scores.  Finally, how 
do all these variables interact and was there a relationship between one or more variables.  
Again, nothing found to indicate a relationship.  However, we know more detailed investigation 
beyond cursory variable analysis will be necessary to achieve a goal of CNATO safety culture 
inculcation.  
The goal when embarking on an academic journey such as this was gathering data 
leading to a new and innovative finding.  Structuring research questions focused on how 
leadership may impact aviation safety in a meaningful way led to many important answers.  
While the data did not support any quantitative measures which suggested leadership influence 
on safety at CNATOs, it did remind this researcher of the philosophical fallacy theory post hoc 
ergo propter hoc.  Aviation serves as an example of a highly complex process where millions of 
factors determine either positive or negative outcomes.  Remembering “after this, therefore 
because of this” underscored complex processes subjected to millions of operations may never 
be explained simply by a finite set of defined variables.  Interaction between external and 
internal variables controlled by no one action created an accident.  Even if study data concluded 




reasoning.  Leadership may very well be an influencer to overall safety and perhaps the correct 
combination of variables were simply not examined by this study.  Scientific study has proven 
statistical correlation does not imply causation.  This realization underscored a study ancillary 
finding of causal relationships, especially in aviation contexts, may actually provide inconclusive 
evidence as to accident cause.   
Despite the challenges of identifying accident precedents, our continued quest for 
knowledge serves as a motivator to find answers through scholarly investigation.  Hopefully, 
building on this and previous studies may unlock a finding which breaks the highly complex 
code of CNATO accidents.  The question is not how research questions could have been changed 
or clarified to get the expected result.  In reality, the study did exactly what any good scientific 
study was intended to do – prove facts.  CNATO safety continues to evolve and encouragement 
of academic research assisting forward movement must continue.  The study identified a higher 
than industry average accident rate currently exists among CNATOs in comparison to scheduled 
carriers.  Safety will remain a challenge until the industry embraces the professionalism and 
accountability required to address challenges.  Continuing to investigate variable relationship is 
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APPENDIX A   
SCISMS Sample Questionnaire 
Formal safety program 
Reporting system 
Please rate your airline’s official system for reporting safety issues and concerns. 
1. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use.  
2. Pilots can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions.  
3. Pilots are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or unsafe 
actions of other pilots. 
4. Pilots don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don’t 
cause any real damage. 
5. Pilots are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was 
caused by their own actions. 
Response and feedback 
These items refer to the response pilots receive from your airline’s official safety system. 
6. Safety issues raised by pilots are communicated regularly to all other pilots in this 
airline. 
7. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner.  
8. Pilots are satisfied with the way this airline deals with safety reports. 
9. My airline only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine ones. 
Safety personnel (e.g., director of flight safety) 
These items refer to the person or people in your airline who are formally designated as 




10. Personnel responsible for safety hold a high status in the airline.  
11. Personnel responsible for safety have the power to make changes.  
12. Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risks involved 
in flying the line. 
13. Safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operations personnel. 
14. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety. 
Informal Aspects of Safety 
Accountability 
These items refer to the ways in which pilots are treated based on their safe or unsafe 
behavior at your airline. 
15. Airline management shows favoritism to certain pilots. 
16. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots in this 
organization. 
17. When pilots make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by 
the airline. 
18. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the pilot. 
Pilots’ authority 
These items refer to the extent to which pilots have the authority to provide input and 
make decisions regarding safety. 
19. Pilots are seldom asked for input when airline procedures are developed or 
changed. 




21. Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the chief pilot or other 
management personnel. 
22. Pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of normal 
flight operations. 
23. Management rarely questions a pilot’s decision to delay a flight for a safety issue.  
Professionalism 
These items refer to the attitudes you perceive among your fellow pilots in regard to 
safety. 
24. Pilots view the airline’s safety record as their own and take pride in it.  
25. Pilots who don’t fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation among other 
pilots. 
26. Pilots with less seniority are willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues.  
27. Decisions made by senior pilots are difficult to challenge.  
28. Pilots don’t cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the operational 
pressures to do so. 
Operations Personnel 
Chief pilots 
These items refer to the chief pilots with whom you interact regularly.  
29. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety 
issues. 
30. Chief pilots are unavailable when line pilots need help.  
31. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don’t care how flight 




32. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations.  
33. Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot rather than the safety 
department. 
Dispatch 
These items refer to your airline’s dispatch procedures. 
34. Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details (e.g., weather 
requirements, NOTAMs) that affect flight safety. 
35. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix 
equipment). 
36. Dispatch is responsive to pilots’ concerns about safety.  
37. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.  
Instructors/trainers 
These items refer to your airline’s flight instructors or trainers. 
38. Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight 
operations. 
39. Safety is consistently emphasized during training at my airline.  
40. Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements.  




These items refer to the value that your airline’s upper level management places on 
safety. 
42. Safety is a core value in my airline.  




44. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means 
compromising safety. 
45. Management doesn’t show much concern for safety until there is an accident or 
incident. 
46. Management does not cut corners where safety is concerned.  
Safety fundamentals 
These items refer to your airline’s typical practices related to safety in various 
areas. 
47. Checklists and procedures are easy to understand.  
48. My airline’s manuals are carefully kept up to date.  
49. My airline is willing to invest money and effort to improve safety.  
50. My airline is committed to equipping aircraft with up-to-date technology.  
51. My airline ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately performed and that 
aircraft are safe to operate. 
Going beyond compliance 
These items refer to upper level management’s commitment to meeting or exceeding 
safety requirements. 
52. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to 
issues of flight safety. 
53. Management schedules pilots as much as legally possible, with little concern for 
pilots’ sleep schedule or fatigue. 
54. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance. 
55. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don’t 
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Data Collection Timeline 

































APPENDIX C   
Participant Email Solicitation 
 
The subject line of the email will clearly state that it is an advertisement for a research 
study, such as: "Seeking participants for an important aviation safety research study"  
 
Dear [CNATO PARTICIPANT], 
You are receiving this email because you and your organization have been randomly 
selected as a Part 135 operator meeting specific study inclusion criterion.  Your email address 
was obtained from the FAA Aviation Data Systems Branch Part 135 “active air operator” 
database. 
The study seeks to investigate intervening variables that lead to organizational accidents 
in Part 135 Air Carriers.  Using the data collected, various theoretical frameworks will be used to 
measure the relationship between an existence of strong safety culture and organizational 
accidents.  Participants will take part in an online survey delivered via a secure and anonymous 
Pepperdine University survey platform.  Your participation will assist in advancing the 
understanding of aviation safety within organizational contexts. 
I would greatly appreciate your participation by clicking on the following link to proceed 
to the anonymous online survey:  [INSERT QUALTRICS LINK HERE] 
Thank you, 






APPENDIX D   
Informed Consent 
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
 
SAFETY CULTURE INCULCATION IN CERTIFIED NON-SCHEDULED AIR TAXI 
OPERATORS: ASSESSING THE PROBABILTY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 
USING MULTIVARIATE FACTORS 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Stephen Birch, under the direction of Dr. 
Eric Hamilton, at Pepperdine University, because you are over the age of 18, a member of a Certified 
Non-Scheduled Air Taxi Operator (CNATO), and have operational responsibility at your respective 
company to significantly influence safety activities.  
 
Your participation is voluntary. You should read the information below, and ask questions about anything 
that you do not understand before deciding whether to participate. Please take as much time as you need 
to read the consent form. You may also decide to discuss participation with your family or friends.  
If you choose to participate, please select AGREE. By selecting AGREE, you are indicating that you 
freely and voluntarily are participating in this study. Completion of the survey is considered to be giving 
full consent.  It is recommended that you print a copy of this consent page for your records before you 
begin the study. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study aims to address the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety culture in CNATOs 
has an effect on organizational accidents.  The study will (a) examine the way leadership introduces and 
reinforces safety culture within an organization (b) how the safety culture is implemented by followers, 
(c) discover investigate the types of artifacts used by the aircraft operator to provide reinforcement of 





This online research study will involve completion of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire will ask 
for general perceptions and personal opinions and reflections regarding leadership and safety experiences 
in your organization.  You may skip any questions that you do not wish to answer.  Participants will be 
expected to complete the questionnaire only once.  It should take you about thirty (30) minutes to 
complete. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
The potential and foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study do not exceed risks 
associated with day-to-day activities. Potential risks subjects may be exposed to include fatigue, boredom, 
or feeling uncomfortable with certain questions. Other risks may include disclosures of internal policies 
and procedures in reference to participant’s role at their relative place of employment, which may impact 





POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
While there are no direct benefits to the study participants, there are several anticipated benefits to society 




I will keep your records for this study confidential, as far as permitted by law. However, if I am required 
to do so by law, I may be required to disclose information collected about you. Examples of the types of 
issues that would require me to break confidentiality are if you tell me about instances of child abuse and 
elder abuse. Pepperdine’s University’s Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) may also access the 
data collected. The HSPP occasionally reviews and monitors research studies to protect the rights and 
welfare of research subjects.  
 
Any identifiable information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. Audio 
recordings from the interview will be immediately transcribed, and all recordings will be destroyed. Your 
responses will be coded with a pseudonym and transcript data will be maintained separately. Any 
reference made to you, or respective institution will be redacted from the transcripts. Upon completion of 
each transcript, the associated audio file will be immediately destroyed. The transcribed data will be 
stored on a password protected computer in the principal investigators place of residency. The transcribed 
file will not be named, to ensure additional confidentiality. All records, handwritten and electronic, will 
be stored in a secure file cabinet in a locked office, in the principal researcher’s home. The data will be 
stored for a minimum of three years, after which the data will be destroyed. Reporting of the data will be 
done in aggregate. Participants will be provided a copy of the formal report, upon completion of the 
study. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue 
participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your 
participation in this research study.  
 
ALTERNATIVES TO FULL PARTICIPATION 
 
The alternative to participation in the study is not participating or completing only the items which you 
feel comfortable.  
 
INVESTIGATOR’S CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
I understand that the investigator is willing to answer any inquiries I may have concerning the research 
herein described. I understand that I may contact Dr. Eric Hamilton at eric.hamilton@pepperdine.edu if I 
have any other questions or concerns about this research.  
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
If you have questions, concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant or research in 
general please contact Dr. Judy Ho, Chairperson of the Graduate & Professional Schools Institutional 
Review Board at Pepperdine University 6100 Center Drive Suite 500, Los Angeles, CA 90045, 310-568-
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APPENDIX G   
Raw SCISMS Survey Results 
 
Table G1 
SCISMS Formal Safety System Participant Reponses  
 
Formal Safety System (FS) 
 
 
Reporting System - Q5.2 
Response and 
Feedback - Q5.3 
  
Safety Personnel - Q5.4 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 
P11009 1 1 2 6 3 1 1 1 7 1 2 1 6 2 
P11015 2 1 2 4 3 3 2 2 5 1 1 1 6 1 
P1143 3 1 2 6 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 6 2 
P1371 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 6 3 3 2 5 3 
P1399 1 1 1 6 1 1 3 3 7 1 1 1 7 2 
P1482 2 1 2 4 3 3 2 2 5 1 1 1 6 1 
P1577 3 1 2 6 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 6 2 
P1750 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 2 6 1 1 1 7 1 
P1784 3 1 2 6 2 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 6 2 
P1921 2 1 3 6 2 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 7 1 
P31098 3 1 2 6 2 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 6 2 
P31112 1 1 2 6 3 1 1 1 7 1 2 1 6 2 
P31218 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 6 3 3 2 5 3 
P31158 1 1 1 6 1 1 3 3 7 1 1 1 7 2 
P31294 1 1 2 6 2 1 2 1 6 1 2 1 6 1 
P31303 3 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 5 2 2 2 6 2 
P31324 3 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 5 2 2 2 6 2 
P31326 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 2 6 1 1 1 7 1 
P51802 1 1 2 6 2 1 2 1 6 1 2 1 6 1 









SCISMS Informational Safety System Participant Reponses 
Informational Safety Systems (IS) 
 
Accountability - Q5.5 Pilot’s Authority - Q5.6 Professionalism – Q5.7 
Participant 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
P11009 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 
P11015 4 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 3 6 
P1143 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
P1371 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 3 4 5 2 7 5 
P1399 5 7 6 6 6 7 6 2 7 7 6 7 5 4 
P1482 4 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 3 6 
P1577 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
P1750 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 
P1784 6 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 6 5 4 
P1921 3 6 5 5 6 6 7 6 6 5 6 5 3 6 
P31098 6 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 6 5 4 
P31112 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 
P31158 3 7 6 6 6 7 6 2 7 7 6 7 5 4 
P31158 2 3 5 6 5 5 6 5 3 4 5 2 1 6 
P31294 7 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 
P31303 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 
P31324 3 4 4 5 5 3 2 5 2 4 6 6 6 6 
P31326 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 
P51802 7 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 






 SCISMS Operations Interaction Participant Reponses 
 
Table G4 
SCISMS Organizational Commitment Participant Reponses 
Organizational Commitment (OC) 
 
Organizational 
Commitment – Q5.11 
Safety          
Fundamentals – Q5.12 
Management 
Commitment – Q13 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 
P11009 7 7 7 7 4 7 7 7 6 7 
    
P11015 7 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 7 7 
    
P1143 6 7 7 7 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 
P1371 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 
P1399 7 6 6 6 4 7 5 7 7 7 7 4 6 7 
P1482 7 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 7 7 
    
(continued) 
Operations Interaction (OI) 
 
Chief Pilots - Q5.8 Dispatch - Q5.9 Instructors - Q5.10 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
P11009 6 6 7 7 4 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 
P11015 7 5 7 7 5 4 4 4 4 6 7 7 6 
P1143      6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 
P1371 3 6 6 6 6 3 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 
P1399 7 5 6 7 4 4 4 6 5 7 6 6 6 
P1482 7 5 7 7 5 4 4 4 4 6 7 7 6 
P1577 7 6 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 
P1750 1 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
P1784 6 6 6 6 5 3 6 6 6 6 6 7 5 
P1921 6 6 7 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 5 
P31098      3 6 6 6 6 6 7 5 
P31112 6 6 7 7 4 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 
P31158 8   8 8 4 4 6 5 7 6 6 6 
P31158 3 6 6 6 6 3 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 
P31294 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 
P31303 6 7 6 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 
P31324      3 6 4 4 6 6 7 6 
P31326 1 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
P51802 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 




Organizational Commitment (OC) 
 
Organizational 
Commitment – Q5.11 
Safety          
Fundamentals – Q5.12 
Management 
Commitment – Q13 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 
P1577 6 7 7 7 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 
P1750 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 7 
P1784 6 7 7 7 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 3 7 6 
P1921 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 
P31098 6 7 7 7 7 5 5 6 6 6 6 3 7 6 
P31112 7 7 7 7 4 7 7 7 6 7 
    
P31158 7 6 6 6 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 4 6 7 
P31158 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 
P31294 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
P31303 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 
P31324 6 6 6 7 7 4 6 6 4 7 6 3 7 6 
P31326 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 7 
P51802 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
P51936 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 
 
 
